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The effects of new skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life in Cameroon

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Astract - This article fills the lack of work on the link between return migration and social cohesion in the country of origin of migration. For the first time, we assess the effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life in Cameroon using original survey data from the Institute of Demographic Training and Research. The main results, based on a probit model, show that formal and informal competences acquired abroad reduce the likelihood that return migrants will improve social relations and increase the probability that they will improve quality of life in their home country. These results remain robust to the inclusion of return migrants from African and non-democratic countries. Correcting for the endogeneity of skills acquired abroad by two-stage probit model with instrumental variables does not alter these conclusions. Similarly, the correction of selection into emigration by using Heckman's (1979) method does not alter the results of the probit model. Our results seem to corroborate the hypothesis that migration contributes to the transfer of norms and practices from destination countries to countries of origin.

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INTRODUCTION

Does return migration increase or reduce social cohesion in the country of origin of migration? Given the importance of social cohesion and the myriad of policy efforts devoted to it, it is surprising that little is known about this issue. Indeed, most of the literature on return migration has focused on the occupational choice of migrants upon return and the determinants of their entrepreneurial activities (see for example, Wahba and Zenou (2012), Marchetta (2012), Hamdouch and Wahba (2015), Wassink (2020), Croitoru (2020) and Tamwo et al. (2022)). This is reductive, as social cohesion is both an end and a means to achieve other economic and development goals (Pervaiz and Chaudhary, 2015; Majeed, 2017).

As an end, more cohesive societies can be seen as harmonious and better places to live through reduced crime and conflict. As a means, social cohesion may have certain implications for different economic outcomes[1] (van Staveren and Knorringa, 2008). First, more cohesive societies have better capacities to manage latent conflicts. They have fewer crimes and a better law and order situation. This creates an environment that is more conducive to investment and better economic growth. Second, in a society with strong social cohesion, fewer resources are needed to enforce law and order and property rights. Third, a potentially lower risk of political instability also allows a cohesive society to attract more investment by reducing transaction costs and creating economies of scale. ,

There are at least two reasons for the lack of work on the link between return migration and social cohesion in the country of origin of migration. The first reason is conceptual. Indeed, since Durkheim's seminal contribution (1893), the authors do not agree on a clear definition of social cohesion. Some see this concept as equivalent to solidarity and trust and others have defined it in the context of social inclusion, poverty and social capital. For example, Durkheim (1893) sees solidarity and shared loyalties as two types of social cohesion. Pervaiz and Chaudhary (2015) see social cohesion as a phenomenon of unity in a society. For Majeed (2017), social cohesion is the ability of a society to ensure the well-being of all its individuals while reducing disparities and preventing marginalisation. Bernard (1999) criticised the fact that social cohesion is nothing more than a quasi concept' because it is vague and can change according to circumstances. This lack of consensus in defining social cohesion also reflects the multiplicity of dimensions and indicators associated with the concept[2].

[1] The literature on the economic implications of social cohesion can be divided into two broad categories (Pervaiz and Chaudhary, 2015). In the first part of the literature, the cohesiveness of society is generally referred to as social capital and measured by various indicators, such as engagement in civic activities, membership in social networks, the number of voluntary associations, trust in formal institutions and interpersonal trust (see, for example, Tabellini (2010) and Bjørnskov (2012)). This type of literature suggests that communities and societies where interpersonal trust is high and where civic and voluntary activities are more numerous can be more cohesive and have better economic outcomes. The second type of literature relies on some indirect measures, such as class division, ethno-linguistic division, elite dominance, material deprivation and social and income inequality as an indicator of social cohesion (see for example, Pervaiz and Chaudhary (2010) and Okediji (2011)). These studies suggest that social cohesion, measured in terms of diversity and different types of inequality, can affect economic growth through its effects on socio-political instability, intergroup conflict, the quality of institutions and the creation of human capital.

[2] By way of illustration, Jenson (1998) identifies five dimensions of social cohesion: belonging, participation, legitimacy, inclusion and recognition. Schiefer and Der Noll (2017) identify six dimensions: social relations, identification, orientation, shared values, equality and objective and surjective quality of life.

The second reason for the lack of work is empirical. The issue of the effect of return migration on social cohesion in the country of origin of migration seems to be much more of a concern for developing countries. However, microeconomic data concerning these countries are scarce. Indeed, although embryonic, the few existing studies, which concern developed countries, rather explore the impact of emigration on the social cohesion of the host country based on a predominantly transnational approach (see for example Fanning (2013)).

The aim of this article is to fill the lack of work on the link between return migration and social cohesion in the country of origin of migration. We advance the scientific discourse in several ways. Firstly, we provide, to our knowledge, the first microeconomic evidence of the effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social cohesion in the country of origin. Secondly, we focus our study on Cameroon, a Central African country with a long and complex migration history and a poor understanding of its consequences. This country, which is also known to have some particular profiles of socio-economic inequality and ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity in Africa, lends itself well to our analysis of the link between return migration and social cohesion. Thirdly, since social cohesion is defined in different dimensions, we focus on two dimensions that are under-explored at the micro level, namely: social relations and quality of life. These dimensions are considered the broadest and most relevant (Jenson, 1998; Bernard, 1999; Schiefer and Der Noll, 2017). Fourthly, as Bucheli et al. (2019) note, the effect of return migration is mainly associated with the attributes that migrants have acquired while abroad. Consequently, we use the skills acquired abroad by the returnee. However, the literature on the effects of return migration focuses on formal skills that incorporate: the level of education acquired and experience gained during formal employment abroad (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015; Wassink, 2020; Croitoru, 2020). It thus ignores informal skills such as the acquisition of external standards or experience gained during non-formal employment. However, there is some evidence that the capital accumulated abroad includes educational and vocational training, professional programs, informal learning, acquisition of a new language and acquisition of external stan-dards (Grabowska and Jastrzebowska, 2019). Our study is therefore based on three indicators that best bring together all this information: new competences in their generality, diplomas and qualifications and other qualifications. Fifthly, we use a rich and under-explored database from the survey conducted in 2012 by the Institute for Demographic Research and Training (IFORD) with the support of the United Nations Population Organization and the European Union. This database enables us to distinguish between the formal and informal skills of returnees acquired abroad in addition to certain fundamental traditional characteristics. Sixthly, empirically, one of the main challenges in determining is the potential endogeneity of skills acquired abroad by return migrants. This could be explained by reverse causality, as the lack of social cohesion may push people to move abroad. To deal with endogeneity, we use two stage probit model with instrumental variables. Finally, to deal with selection into emigration, we use Heckman's (1979) two-stage selection model.

The main results show that formal and informal skills acquired abroad reduce the probability that return migrants improve social relations and increase the likelihood that they will improve quality of life in their home country.

The remainder of the article is organised in five sections. Section 1 sets out the analytical framework for the study. Section 2 presents the Cameroonian migration context. Section 3 describes the methodological framework. Section 4 carries out the empirical analysis.

1. THEORETICAL AND RELATED LITERATURE

Skills acquired abroad by return migrants can affect social cohesion in the country of origin through the institutional quality channel and the welfare channel.

1.1. Return migrants and the quality of institutions in home countries

The quality of institutions is a determinant of social cohesion (Schiefer and Van der Noll, 2017; Majeed, 2017). Thus, by influencing the quality of institutions in the country of origin, the skills acquired abroad by return migrants affect social cohesion. This hypothesis derives from Levitt's (1998) theory of social transfers. According to Levitt (1998), the migratory experience allows migrants to absorb the external norms and practices that they implant in their communities of origin once they return. These foreign norms and practices influence the quality of institutions in the country of origin.

Among the few works devoted to the transfer of political norms, those of Spilimbergo (2009), Batista and Vicenté (2011), Chauvet and Mercier (2014) and Mercier (2016) are particularly noteworthy. Spilimbergo (2009) shows, based on a panel of developing countries, that external studies promote democracy in migrants' countries of origin. More precisely, he reveals that the level of democracy conveyed by the migrant in his country of origin is a function of his level in the host country. Batista and Vicenté (2011) will examine this relationship at the microeconomic level in the case of Cape Verde. Their results reveal that migration positively affects the demand for political accountability. This positive effect is attributed in particular to return migrants from countries with good institutional quality. In the case of Mali, Chauvet and Mercier (2014) examine the relationship between return migrants and political outcomes. They find that the return of migrants has a positive and significant effect on participation rates and electoral competitiveness. Finally, Mercier (2016) analyses the impact of the migratory experience of political leaders on their governance once they return. Her results show that leaders who have studied abroad have a positive and significant effect on the level of democracy in their country during their mandates.

1.2. Return migrant and welfare in the home countries

The skills acquired abroad by return migrants can also affect social cohesion positively or negatively by increasing or reducing the well-being of individuals in the country of origin. The positive effect comes from three non-exclusive mechanisms. First, returnees increase welfare by reducing unemployment and improving the quality of employment of non-migrants (Hausmann and Nedelkoska, 2018). This reduces latent conflicts and strengthens social cohesion (Bjørnskov, 2012). For example, Hausmann and Nedelkoska (2018) show in the case of Greece that, during the economic recession, the return of migrants was accompanied by more decent jobs and higher wages for non-migrants. Second, return migrants increase well-being by raising the educational performance of their children as well as their relatives through: income, reallocation of effort, changing perceptions about the value of education and remediation (Chen 2013; Liu et al., 2018). As an illustration, with earned income from migration, migrant parents can invest more in their children's education. Third, returnees reduce violence by contributing to social renewal and economic growth in their home communities (Bucheli et al., 2019). For example, Bucheli et al. (2019) find that higher rates of return migration lead to lower local homicide rates in Mexico.

The negative effect is associated with income and gender inequalities. These inequalities generate social conflict (Okediji, 2011) and deteriorate social cohesion.

With regard to income inequality, return migrants are more likely to find work than people of the same socio-economic background who have not migrated. Compared to people who have never spent time abroad, return migrants generally possess higher formal human capital, including language, work experience, business skills and formal qualifications (Dustmann, 1999). Returnees also bring back informal human capital in the form of social knowledge and technical skills acquired in foreign schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces (Grabowska and Jastrzebowska, 2019). The result is a higher gain for return migrants than for those who did not emigrate. Thus, the return of migrants negatively affects the gain of non-migrants (De Coulon and Piracha, 2005; Tuccio and Wahba, 2018). For example, De Coulon and Piracha (2005), looking at returnees from Albania, find that regardless of gender, the experience of migration increases the hourly wage rate of returnees once they return. As for gender inequality, Tuccio and Wahba (2018) show that the return of migrants reinforces gender inequalities in the case of the Middle East. Using two indicators of gender inequality, namely women's freedom of mobility and decision-making power, the authors conclude that women residing in migrant families are more likely to bear the traditional gender equality norms than those with no migration experience.

2. THE CAMEROONIAN CONTEXT

Cameroon lends itself well to our analysis of the link between skills acquired abroad by return migrants and social cohesion. This country, with a surface area of 475442 km2 and an estimated population of 26545863 million inhabitants with Christian (56.5%), traditional (26%) and Muslim (21.8%) religions, has: 240 ethnic groups, 248 indigenous and regional languages, two official languages (French and English) and two languages (Camfranglais and Pidgin) resulting from contact with the French and English languages (Ndibnu Messina, 2013). This religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity, a source of social fragmentation, is a potential threat to social cohesion (Schiefer and Der Noll, 2017). Economic and political conditions can also be associated with this diversity.

On the economic level, after the rapid economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s, followed the difficulties of the 1980s and 1990s orchestrated by a succession of crises that created a spiral of debt. As a solution, the Bretton Woods Institutions imposed Structural Adjustment Programs on Cameroon. This led to the devaluation of its currency, the CFA Franc, in January 1994, the privatisation and closure of several public enterprises, the rise of mass unemployment and a steady deterioration of living conditions. In reaction, the Cameroonian people adopted migration, mainly to Europe, the United States, the Near and Far East, as a solution to improving their living conditions.

On the political level, after the reunification of French and English speaking Cameroon on October 1, 1961 and the creation of a federal state, the first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo, installed a single party regime and unilaterally ended the federal state on May 20, 1972. This situation reinforced the secessionist movement in the English-speaking part of the country and condemned many Cameroonians to exile. Cameroon experienced a relatively stable period until the peaceful transition at the head of the supreme magistracy on November 6, 1982 between Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya. The latter, under international and national pressure, restored multiparty politics in 1991 and declared a general amnesty. This led to the return of migrants creating or strengthening opposition parties. But the first multiparty elections in 1992 saw his victory vigorously contested by the opposition. This creates a climate of social tension and repression fuelled by tribalist discourse and ethnic

discrimination. Since then, this cycle has been repeated in every presidential election; exacerbated since 2008 by the suppression of the constitution of the limitation of presidential mandates. In addition, since 2016, there has been a radicalisation, through the creation of armed gangs, of the secessionist movement in the English-speaking part of the country. This movement as well as the radical political opposition to President Paul Biya seem to be encouraged by a large part of the Cameroonian diaspora in favour of political transition.

3. DATA, VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY

3.1. Data

We rely on the unique data collected from August 4 to September 9, 2012 in Cameroon by the Institute of Demographic Training and Research (IFORD). These data were collected in the framework of the project entitled "Impact of South-South migration on the development of Cameroon" and financed by the United Nations Population Fund and the European Union.

Figure 1. Percentage distribution of migrants by region in Cameroon



Data derived from the survey conducted by IFORD.

This survey also provides information on the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants. More particularly, in the case of return migrants, the data collected provide information on age, marital status, gender, level of education, activity before leaving Cameroon, migratory experience, reasons for returning to Cameroon. The administered questionnaire allows data collection in 82 villages spread over the ten regions of Cameroon in addition to Douala and Yaoundé. Table 7 in the Appendix gives

a breakdown of the villages surveyed by region. Figure 1 gives the percentage distribution of returnees in the ten regions of Cameroon. From this data collection, 332 return migrants emerged. The favorite destination of return migrants is Central Africa, which accounts for a percentage of 46.68%, followed by West Africa 32.53%, Europe 9.93%, the Maghreb 5.41%, other continents 4.21% and other countries (Madagascar, Botswana, and Sudan)[3] 1.204%.

3.2. Variables

3.2.1. Social relations and quality of life variables

Our understanding of the notion of social cohesion is not limited to interpersonal relationships and ties. Interpersonal relationships are only one dimension of social cohesion (van Staveren and Knorringa, 2008). A society will only be cohesive if the bridging social capital (social relations and harmony between groups) is also strengthened (Schiefer and Der Noll, 2017). Therefore, focusing exclusively on one dimension of social cohesion may not be an appropriate way to study this multidimensional phenomenon. Similarly, combining indicators related to differrent dimensions of social cohesion in order to produce a unit index that can reflect social cohesion may also be problematic, as it does not show which dimension of social cohesion is important for determining economic outcomes (Pervaiz and Chaudhary, 2015).

In the empirical literature, several variables are used to approcimate social cohesion. These include common values, civic culture, social order, social solidarity and sense of membership (Reeskens et al., 2008); marital status, social contracts, group membership, and trust (Klein, 2013); equality of social outcomes, cooperation, diversity, and affinity (Stanley, 2003); and level of trust, willingness to cooperate, identity/belonging, inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, social inclusion, social capital, and quality of life (Berger-Schmitt, 2002; Knack 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Easterly, 2006; Manole, 2012).

More recently, to capture social cohesion, Majeed (2016) uses intergroup cohesion which is a dimension of the Indices of Social Development (ISD) provided by the International Institute of Social Studies (IISS). According to the IISS, intergroup cohesion, a measure of ethnic and sectarian tensions and discrimination, refers to relations of cooperation and respect between identity groups in a society. Thus, to capture social cohesion, the IISS uses data on intergroup disparities, perceptions of discrimination, feelings of distrust against members of other groups, terrorism acts, terrorism and social instability, murders, strikes, kidnappings, agency ratings on the likelihood of civil desorder, number of reported incidents of riots, reported levels of involvement in violent riots and clashes (Majeed, 2016)

In light of this literature, in this study, we use two broad indicators of social cohesion considered most relevant by Schiefer and Der Noll (2017): social relations (captured by agreement between communities) and quality of life (captured by standard of living). Social relations remains the most relevant component of social cohesion (Schiefer and Der Noll, 2017). Furthermore, this variable can be assimilated to the social solidarity of Reeskens et al. (2008) or the intergroup cohesion of the IISS.

[3] As far as migrants from Central Africa are concerned, 57 come from Gabon and 38 from Chad, i.e. a respective percentage of 36.8% and 24.5% of all migrants from Central Africa. In the case of West Africa, Nigeria alone received 74 migrants, i.e. 68.5%. In the case of Europe, France alone received 20 of these migrants, i.e. 60.6%. In the case of the Maghreb, the distribution seems more balanced.

The two indicators selected are binary variables. Agreement between communities[4] is an indicator based on the perception of migrants that takes the value 1 in the case of agreement between communities and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, quality of life takes the value 1 in the case where the household containing a migrant is assumed to be poor and and 0 otherwise. For the construction of the poverty indicator, we focus on the methodology used by the National Institute of Statistics of Cameroon (INS, 2014). In contrast to the methodology used by the INS[5], we rely on two elements: a welfare indicator and the poverty line (welfare indicator below which the household is considered poor). The welfare indicator used is an aggregate of annual household consumption per adult equivalent constructed in two stages. According to Deaton and Zaidi (2002), in most developing countries where a standard of living survey and/or a household expenditure survey is available, consumption is the appropriate measure to use (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). First, a consumption aggregate is calculated at the household level. Second, to account for differences in the cost of living across regions, transportation costs, and other transition costs, this aggregate is divided by a space deflator[6]. The poverty line used is that obtained from the fourth Cameroonian household survey (ECAM 4), which is 339715 FCFA (INS, 2014). Thus, the consumption aggregate obtained is compared to this poverty line. When it is below this line, the individual is qualified as poor. Consequently, the indicator takes the value 1 and in the opposite case, the individual is qualified as not poor and the indicator takes the value 0.

3.2.2. Skills acquired abroad by return migrants variables

Because the effect of return migration is mainly associated with the attributes that migrants acquire during their stay abroad (Bucheli et al., 2019), we use the formal and informal skills acquired abroad. Indeed, during their stay abroad, migrants acquire standards and skills that they transfer back to their home country upon return (Levitt, 1998; Spilimbergo, 2009; Batista and Vicenté, 2011; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014; Mercier, 2016). We therefore select three indicators that best bring together all this information, namely: new skills as a whole (qualifications), degrees and qualifications and other qualifications (acquisition of social and environmental standards, improvement of life skills and other training taking place in an informal setting). Degrees and qualifications: this refers to any skill formally acquired that leads to a degrees or qualification. To capture this variable, in the questionnaire, the question asked is: while living abroad, did you obtain any degrees or qualifications? 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. In the case of the variable other qualifications, the question asked is: while living abroad, did you receive any new ideas or acquire any new skills, other than those already discussed, that have been useful now that you're back in Cameroon? 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. The modalities associated with the following question support the idea that these are skills acquired in an informal setting. Indeed, the following question is formulated as follows: What is the new skill acquired?[7].

[4] In the question used to capture the dependent variable, the word community refers to the different ethnic groups living in the village. In other words, people are asked whether this ethnic multiplicity is conducive to living together.

[5] Institut National de la Statistique (National Institute of Statistics).

[6] The information on the spatial deflator is contained in Table 7. The information on the composition of the household with a migrant was not available, so we did not take into account the equivalence scale.

[7] I learned a new language (1), I learned to improve my life skills (e.g., how to drive, how to cook new dishes) (2), I learned about new social or political issues (e.g., the importance of protecting the environment) (3), Other (4).

Table 1. Variable' presentation

Variables	Description	Observ.	Average	Standard errors
Variable of interest				
Qualifications	=1 if the migrant has received any training or qualification of any kind and 0 otherwise	*332*	0.3012	0.4594
Degrees and qualifications	=1 if the migrant has acquired new training and qualifications abroad during his stay. 0 otherwise	332	0.256	0.4821
Other qualifications	= 1 if the migrant has acquired other competences such as conduct, social and environmental norms or any other informally acquired competence. 0 otherwise	332	0.364	0.481
Dependent variable				
Social relations	=1 if there is an agreement between the communities and 0 otherwise.The main limitation of this variable is that it is a surjective opinion of the migrants	332	0.704	0.456
Quality of life	= 1 if the household containing the migrant is considered poor and 0 otherwise	332	0.3915	0.488
Instruments				
Involuntary return	=1 If the migrant was deported abroad and 0 otherwise	332	0.0542	0.2267
Other migration-related Characteristics				
Duration abroad	Variable valued in months ranging from 3 to 390 months	332	46.903	51.612
Remittances	=1 if the migrant had transferred money to a person while abroad and 0 otherwise	332	0.2078	0.40637
Age	Variable that ranging from 12 to 77 years	332	36.858	12.843
Age squared	To account for the effect of increasing age on the dependent variable. Similary to other studies we consider ager squared divided by 100 (Lacuesta, 2010)	332	15.230	11.169
Duration since return	Estimated duration in months ranging from 9 to 566 months	332	88.487	91.864
Other determinants of social cohesion				
National language (English)	=1 if the migrant is fluent in English and 0 otherwise	332	0.093	0.2996
National language (French)	=1 if the migrant is fluent in French and 0 otherwise	332	0.7108	0.4549
Fluent in Fufuldé	=1 if the migrant is fluent in Fufuldé and 0 otherwise	332	0.253	0.435
Fluent in Pidgin	=1 if the migrant is fluent in Pidgin and 0 otherwise.	332	0.1385	0.346
Fluent in Beti	=1 if the migrant is fluent in Beti and 0 otherwise	332	0.093	0.2996
Immigrant investment	=1 if immigrants have invested in Cameroon and 0 otherwise	332	0.213	0.3552
Immigrant insecurity	= 1 if immigrants cause insecurity in Cameroon and 0 otherwise. The main limitation of this variable is that it is a surjective opinion of the migrants	332	0.1457	0.3552

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued

Variables	Description	Observ.	Average	Standard errors
Refugee insecurity	=1 if refugees cause insecurity in Cameroon and 0 otherwise. The main limitation of this variable is that it is a surjective opinion of the migrants	332	0.867	0.3902
Place of residence	= 1 if the migrant lives in an urban area and o otherwise	332	0.8373	0.3696
Variables related to the selection model				
Age	Variable that ranging from 11 to 92 years	4004	31.2265	15.507
Age squared	To account for the effect of increasing age on the dependent variable. Similary to other studies we consider ager squared divided by 100 (Lacuesta, 2010)	4004	12.1551	12.588
Marital status	=1 If the household is in a couple and 0 otherwise	4004	0.4315	0.4953
Educational level	= 0 if the household has no level of education (reference group), 1 in the case of primary education, 1 in the case of secondary and 2 in the case of higher education	4004	1.65435	0.7893
Sex	= 1 the individual is female and 0 if he is a male	4004	0.4895	0.4999
Place of residence	=1 if the household lives in a rural area and 0 otherwise	4004	0.79146	0.4063
Land	=1 if the household owns land and 0 otherwise	4004	0.4578	0.4983
Livestock	=1 if the household owns livestock and 0 otherwise	4004	0.2005	0.4004

Source: Authors, based on the survey conducted by IFORD.

With regard to qualifications, a variable that captures the acquisition of a skill acquired through a formal or informal process. It is obtained by summing the two previous variables (degrees and qualifications and other qualifications) from the stata software. Modality 2 materializes the individuals having acquired the skills in a formal and informal way. Modality 1 symbolizes individuals having acquired a skill exclusively through a formal or informal process. Finally, modality 0 represents individuals who have not acquired any skills abroad. Then, this variable is recoded into a binary variable by replacing modality 2 with 1. Thus, the new modality obtained, which takes the value of 1, represents individuals who have acquired either any skill abroad or both (skills acquired through a formal and informal process). The modality 0 represents those who have not obtained any skills.

3.2.3. Socio-demographic characteristics and other control variables

We also retain two categories of additional explanatory variables. The first category consists of socio-demographic characteristics: age, age squared, duration after return, duration abroad and remittances. The age of migrants reflects their capacity to act as agents of development in their communities of origin (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015; Wassink, 2020). Age squared captures the effect of the increasing age of migrants on their ability to drive change in their communities of origin (Wassink, 2020). Length of time abroad is correlated with skill acquisition and therefore with the ability of migrants to be agents of development for their communities of origin (Cassarino, 2004). Duration after migration provides information on the integration

of the migrant into his or her community of origin (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015). Remittances influence social cohesion either by reducing inequalities in the countries of origin (Ratha, 2013) or by accentuating them by increasing the income of the most affluent households (Ofori et al., 2022).

The second category includes control variables such as: language proficiency (fluency in official languages – French and English – and local languages – Beti, Pidgin and Fufuldé –); immigrant and refugee background (immigrant crime, immigrant investment, refugee crime and refugee labour); and residence background. Language proficiency provides information on the level of fragmentation in society. The inclusion of immigrants and refugees results from the fact that migrants are not accepted by the natives because on the one hand, they reduce the possibilities of the natives on the labour market and on the other hand, cause insecurity (Fanning, 2013; Forrester et al., 2019). Immigrants or refugees can cause insecurity in the host country if they do not manage to find a job or to integrate in the host country. Therefore, they can become criminals (Fanning 2013; Forrester et al. 2019).The place of residence determines the level of poverty (Sekkat, 2017). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used.

3.3. Estimation strategy

As part of this study, we adapt the specification of Ivlevs and King (2017) to the context of our study. The choice of this specification is based on the fact that the authors analyses the effects of emigration on corruption. Corruption as an institutional indicator is considered to belong to the social relations dimension of social cohesion (Berger-Schimitt, 2002). We model the probability (Y_i^*) that a returnee *i* will influence social cohesion. Since the latent probability of influencing social cohesion depend on unobserved factors, we can not estimate directly Y_i^*. Thus the specified model captures the observed probability that returnee *i* will influence social cohesion Y_i .We do not observe Y_i^* unless the returnee *i* influenced the social cohesion of his home country. That is to say:

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} 1 \ if \ \ Y_i^* \succ 0 \\ 0 \ if \ \ Y_i^* \leq 0 \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

The unobservable latent variable Y_i^* is written:

$$Y_i^* = \alpha X + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

More spécifically, equation 2 is witten:

$$Y_i^* = \mu + \tau Skills + \beta \boldsymbol{X_i} + \varepsilon_i \tag{3}$$

where, for individual *i*, the dependent variable is approximated by the agreement between communities and by the standard of living. The explanatory variable of interest *Skills* represents the attributes that the returnee acquires during his/her stay abroad and approximated alternately by the new competences as a whole (qualifications), degrees and qualifications and other qualifications. ***X*** represents the vector of socio-demographic characteristics and other control variables. ε_i denotes the error term, distributed according to a normal distribution of mean 0 and variance 1. Given the binary nature of social relations and quality of life, we estimate equation (2) using a probit. However, to guard against a potential problem of endogeneity, we also use an instrumental variable (IV) probit.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Baseline results

For a better analysis, we proceed in two steps. First, we present and discuss the results of the estimation of the probit model in the case where the dependent variable is social relations. These results are recorded in the first half of Table 2. Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2 summarize the results when, respectively, the variable of interest for skills acquired abroad by return migrants is degrees and qualifications, other qualifications and new competences as a whole (qualifications). For each of the variables of interest, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant. In other words, the new skills acquired abroad by the return migrant have a negative effect on the likelihood of agreement between communities in Cameroon.

Theoretically, the new skills acquired abroad can have a negative influence on social cohesion in the country of origin through two mechanisms, namely the triggering and ending of conflict. The triggering of conflict by migrants can be caused by the sharing of their experience of life abroad with non-migrants. This sharing of experience may concern the egalitarian treatment accorded to all social groups in the host country. For example, such an experience may encourage non-migrants belonging to disadvantaged social groups (linguistic, religious or ethnic) to rebel against priority social groups or to join groups aiming to overthrow the government in power (Gurr, 1970). This situation can lead to the outbreak of civil war, a conflict often fuelled by remittances or savings collected abroad. The literature is full of evidence that these financial resources are not used to improve the living conditions of non-migrants. On the contrary, they are used to finance rebellions against the state in migrants' countries of origin (Elu and Price, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that larger diasporas in the United States increase the likelihood of civil war breaking out in the countries of origin. Furthermore, in the event of conflict between social groups, migrants being generally better educated than non-migrants (Beine and Sekkat, 2013; Dutta and Roy, 2011), reduce the chances of the state and opposing groups reaching an agreement (Miller and Ritter, 2014). This may involve presenting the negative points of the peace agreement or ceasefire. Consequently, migrants can influence negotiations between rebel groups and the state in the event of conflict.

This negative effect can also be explained by the transmission of norms received from outside. Indeed, during their stay abroad, migrants acquire political, social and institutional norms that are different from those of their country of origin, which they pass on to non-migrants upon their return (Spilimbergo, 2009; Batista and Vicenté, 2011; Mercier, 2013; Tuccio and Wahba, 2018). In the literature, migrants receive values that depend on the host country (Batista and Vicente, 2011; Spilimbergo, 2009). The negative effect can be explained by the fact that the database focuses on South-South migration. Most African countries have experienced social fragmentation in the past. We have the case of the Biafran war (1967-1970) which was a conflict between ethnic groups, the main ones being the Haoussas, Yoruba and Igbo (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1990). We also have the conflicts between muslims and christians in the Central African Republic (Arieff, 2014). Having lived in these countries, migrants transmit values that alter social cohesion in the country of origin.

Finally, this negative effect can also be explained by the level of preparation before the return. In the theoretical literature Cassarino (2004) distinguishes three types of preparation for return. Migrants with a high level of preparation (on average 4 to 15 years abroad), migrants with a low level of preparation (on average at least 3 years abroad) and those with no level of preparation (less than 6 months abroad). According

to Cassarino (2004), only migrants with high levels of preparation are able to positively impact their home country upon return through accumulated savings and new skills acquired abroad. Those with low levels of preparedness typically have accumulated only small savings. Because of their limited time abroad, they have not accumulated new skills and are therefore less likely to impact their home communities upon return. Finally, those with no preparation have not accumulated any resources abroad and therefore cannot impact their home communities upon return. Thus, the negative effect of new skills acquired abroad can also be explained by the fact that migrants had a low level of preparation. Indeed, Table 8 (in appendix) shows that 65.1% of the migrants have spent less than three years abroad. According to Cassarino (2004), they cannot positively impact their communities.

Table 2 shows that the language inherited from colonization, namely: English has a negative and significant effect on social relations unlike the local language. The negative effect of the language can be explained by the fact that it was at the origin of identity-based withdrawal as has been the case in Cameroon for several years in the English-speaking part (Musah, 2022). The negative and significant effect of immigrant investment on social relations can be explained by the fact that instead of seeing migrant investment as an opportunity for job creation, non-migrants perceive immigrants as a rule as people who reduce employment opportunities in the labour market. For Altonji and Card (1991), an increased labour supply contributes to depressing the average wage of natives and immigrants as the labour demand curve falls. By lowering average wages, immigration shifts earnings from wage earners to capital owners.

Second, we present and discuss the results of the estimation of the probit model in the case where the dependent variable is quality of life. The results, when the variable of interest for skills acquired abroad by return migrants is degrees and qualifications, other qualifications and new skills in their entirety (qualifications), are presented in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 2 respectively. Regardless of the variable of interest for skills acquired abroad by return migrants, the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This means that the new skills acquired abroad by the returnee positively affect the probability of quality of life in his or her home country. On the one hand, this result is consistent with Hausmann and Nedelkoska (2018), who show that return migrants increase welfare by reducing unemployment and improving the income and job quality of non-migrants. On the other hand, this result is also consistent with those of Chen (2013) and Liu et al. (2018), who find that return migrants increase welfare by raising the educational performance of their children and relatives. Moreover, the positive effect can be further explained by the work of Borjas (2014) which shows the effect of return migration on the wage structure of non-migrants. The impact of return migration on the wage structure depends entirely on the comparison and distribution of skills between migrants and non-migrants. If return migrants are relatively low-skilled, the wages of unskilled natives decrease and the wages of the skilled increase. On the other hand, if return migrants are relatively skilled, the wage of the unskilled increases and the wage of the skilled decreases. In both cases, the effect of return migration is positive and its magnitude depends on the differences between the skill specialisations of migrants and natives and the share of migrants in the labour force.

Table 2 also shows that remittances, duration abroad and duration after migration improve the living standards of non-migrants. The positive effect of remittances is explained by the fact that they increase the income of recipient households, which can generate a multiplier effect for the whole community (Glytsos, 1993). This result is consistent with those of Adams and Page (2005) who show in a sample of 71 developing countries that remittances significantly reduce the level, depth and severity of

po-verty in the developing world. The positive effect of duration abroad is explained by the fact that migrants choose an optimal duration abroad that allows them to build up sufficient resources in preparation for their return (Mesnard, 2004). The empirical literature shows that duration abroad is positively related to post-migration investment (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015). Therefore, the duration abroad is positively related to the improvement of the living standards of non-migrants. Finally, the positive effect of duration after migration reflects the idea of readjustment to one's community of origin (Cassarino, 2004). The faster it adapts, the faster migrants can use the resources they have to invest in an entrepreneurial activity to improve the living conditions of non-migrants (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015).

The probit specification represented by equation 3 does not solve the endogeneity problems (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015; Wassink, 2020) driven by the variables new skills. In case of endogeneity, the coefficients from the estimation of the probit model may be under-or overestimated (Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015). Thus, to solve this endogeneity problem, we estimate a two-stage probit with instrumental variables.

4.2. Robustness checks

We carry out three robustness checks. Firstly, to assess the sensitivity of the results in terms of transmission of standards we distinguish two cases. In the first case, we make the estimates by separating our database into return migrants from African countries and return migrants from non-African countries (Table 3). In the second case, we make the estimates by dividing our database into return migrants from democratic countries and return migrants from non-democratic countries (Table 4). The results remain identical to those obtained in Table 2 for the sample of return migrants from African countries and the sample of return migrants from non-democratic countries. In the cases of the sample of return migrants from non-African countries and the sample of return migrants from non-democratic countries, we do not observe statistically significant effects. This may be due to the size of the sample, which remains very small in these cases.

Secondly, a problem of endogenity resulting from the existence of reverse causality may arise. The lack of social cohesion in the country of origin may push individuals to migrate. More specifically, the standard of living of the household or violence between communities can be considered as factors that explain migration. King (2012) argues that migration is driven by socio-economic factors in the migrants' home country. Thus, once abroad, migrants acquire skills that match the needs of the home country (Cassorino, 2004). At the same time, the new skills acquired abroad influence social cohesion in the home country. These new skills may enable migrants to invest and thus improve the living standards of non-migrants (Wassink, 2020; Hamdouch and Wahba, 2015). Second, Levitt's (1998) studies show that once abroad, migrants are exposed to practices and values that they pass on to their relatives either through telephone contacts or once they return. Thus, migrants who have lived in countries where different communities live peacefully, transfer these values to their home communities upon return. In order to control for this potential endogeneity problem, we use a two-stage probit model probit with instrumental variables (IV). According to Greene (2008), a good instrument should be highly correlated with the endogenous predictor but should not have an unobser-vable relationship with the dependent variable. For example, Wahba and Zenou (2012) use average real international oil prices for each individual at the age of 25 as an instrument for return migration in the Egyptian context because 95 per cent of return migrants come from arable countries where oil prices play a crucial role in the demand for foreign labour. We cannot use this variable because most migrants come from the South. Other authors use the local migrant network and the

local squared migrant network (Démurger and Xu, 2011; Woodruff and Zeneto, 2007; Wassink, 2020). The local migrant network affects the probability of migrating by increasing the subjective cost of non-migration, which increases the diversion of non-migrants from their migrant peers (Stark and Taylor, 1989). More recently, Wassink (2020) use the community level prevalence at the 15 years old. Although relevant, we cannot use these variables, mainly due to data availability.

According to Cassarino (2004), once abroad, migrants mobilise two types of resources, namely tangible resources (savings) and intangible resources (migrant networks, new skills). For Cassarino (2004), the mobilisation of resources abroad depends on preparation, which is a function of time. Consequently, an unplanned return impacts the mobilisation of resources (tangible and intangible). In the particular case of tangible resources (savings), authors point out that the capital stock accumulated by the migrant at the time of return depends on the duration of the stay abroad (Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Whaba and Zenou, 2002). Empirically, Hamdouch and Wahba (2015) support the theoretical predictions by instrumenting tangible resources (duration abroad proxies savings) by involuntary return. The authors show that involuntary return affects resource mobilisation abroad. Given the fact that new skills integrate resources acquired abroad, to instrument them, as Hamdouch and Wahba (2015), we use involuntary migration. We argue that involuntary return affects skill acquisition abroad but does not affect social cohesion in the home country. According to Cassarino (2004), once abroad, migrants mobilise two types of resources namely tangible resources (savings) and intangible resources (migrant networks, new skills). For Cassarino (2004), the mobilisation of resources abroad depends on preparation, which is a function of time. Consequently, an unplanned return impacts the mobilisation of resources (tangible and intangible). In the particular case of tangible resources (savings), authors point out that the capital stock accumulated by the migrant at the time of return depends on the duration of the stay abroad (Dutsmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Whaba and Zenou, 2002). Empirically, Hamdouch and Wahba (2015) support the theoretical predictions by instrumenting tangible resources (duration abroad proxies savings) by involuntary return. The authors show that involuntary return affects resource mobilization abroad. Given the fact that new skills integrate resources acquired abroad, to instrument them, along with Hamdouch and Wahba (2015), we use involuntary migration. We argue that voluntary return affects skill acquisition abroad but does not affect social cohesion in the home country. The specification equation for the two-stage probit model with instrumental variables is:

$$Skills_i = a_0 X + a_1 Inv_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{4}$$

where Inv_i refers to involuntary return to the host country by the migrant *i*. Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of the probit model with instrumental variable. In Table 5, columns (1), (2) and (3) confirm that our instrument is negative and statistically significant at the 10%, 1% and 5 % threshold respectively. The p-values associated with the Wald exogeneity test are respectively: 0.602, 0.472, and 0.701 in the case of degrees and qualifications, other qualifications, and qualifications. Thus, the Wald test of exogeneity failed to reject the hypothesis that the error term in the first stage is not correlated with the error term in the second stage of the regression. The non-significant Wald test indicates that endogeneity is not a serious concern in the case of return migration and social cohesion in the case of Cameroon.This finding is consistent with studies on return migrants (Wassink, 2020). Overall, controlling for endogeneity with the two-stage probit model with exogenous regressors does not alter the conclusions in Table 2.

Table 2. Effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life (probit model)

	Social relations			Quality of life		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Degrees and qualifications	-0.118*			0.185***		
	(0.0668)			(0.0684)		
Other qualifications		-0.160***			0.138**	
		(0.0597)			(0.0618)	
Qualifications			-0.176***			0.173***
			(0.0559)			(0.0586)
Duration abroad	0.00113	0.00103	0.00118*	0.000808	0.000945*	0.000862**
	(0.00069)	(0.000655)	(0.00068)	(0.00056)	(0.000566)	(0.00043)
Duration since return	4.06e-05	-2.80e-05	9.00e-06	0.000342	0.000442*	0.000412**
	(0.00040)	(0.00040)	(0.0004)	(0.00042)	(0.00026)	(0.00014)
Age	-0.00636	-0.00684	-0.00645	0.00883	0.00937	0.00900
	(0.00940)	(0.00961)	(0.00964)	(0.00984)	(0.00987)	(0.00991)
Age squared	8.43e-05	9.36e-05	8.73e-05	-7.56e-05	-8.75e-05	-8.03e-05
	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)	(0.00011)
Remittances	-0.0314	0.00272	-0.000951	0.0329	0.00194	0.00328**
	(0.0588)	(0.0590)	(0.0587)	(0.0628)	(0.0634)	(0.000194)
Place of residence	-0.102	-0.102	-0.111*	-0.0215	-0.0300	-0.0209
	(0.0670)	(0.0671)	(0.0660)	(0.0819)	(0.0822)	(0.0822)
National language (French)	-0.0477	-0.0662	-0.0570	-0.00856	0.0223	0.0142
	(0.0646)	(0.0632)	(0.0638)	(0.0695)	(0.0680)	(0.0685)
National language (English)	-0.209***	-0.189***	-0.186***	0.0465	0.0447	0.0363
	(0.0695)	(0.0701)	(0.0698)	(0.0708)	(0.0709)	(0.0712)
Fluent in Beti	0.235*	0.263**	0.226*	0.219	0.237*	0.209
	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.135)
Fluent in Fufulbé	0.131**	0.134**	0.142**	-0.0157	-0.00472	-0.0128
	(0.0623)	(0.0623)	(0.0615)	(0.0749)	(0.0747)	(0.0748)
Fluent in Pidgin	0.170**	0.162**	0.157**	0.0965	0.0949	0.104
	(0.0662)	(0.0675)	(0.0682)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Immigrant investment	-0.152**	-0.155**	-0.145**	-0.0373	-0.0251	-0.0377
	(0.0721)	(0.0720)	(0.0722)	(0.0718)	(0.0716)	(0.0717)
Immigrant insecurity	-0.000308	-0.00527	-0.0204	-0.0183	-0.0108	0.00284
	(0.0760)	(0.0764)	(0.0782)	(0.0842)	(0.0840)	(0.0852)
Refugee insecurity	-0.0238	-0.0231	-0.0104	0.114	0.120	0.111
	(0.0745)	(0.0750)	(0.0745)	(0.0825)	(0.0819)	(0.0823)
Pseudo R^2	0.107	0.118	0.124	0.06	0.055	0.065
Observations	311	311	311	311	311	311

*Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * siginificant at 10%.*

Finally, Studies focusing on return migration show that there is a problem of selection into emigration and selection into return (Elmallakh and Wahba, 2021; Wahba, 2015). Regarding selection into emigration, Docquier et al. (2011) show that migrants self-select along two dimensions: education and ethnicity. For other authors, migrants self-select according to age, place of residence and gender (Gmelch, 1980).

Table 3. Robustness. Return migrants from African countries *versus* return migrants from non-African countries (probit model)

	Social relations						Quality of life					
	Africa countries			Other countries			Africa countries			Other countries		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Degrees and qualifications	-0.158**			-0.0624			0.273***			0.162		
	(0.0719)			(0.220)			(0.0757)			(0.305)		
Other qualifications		-0.130**			-0.183			0.159**			0.0902	
		(0.0628)			(0.201)			(0.0673)			(0.241)	
Qualifications			-0.171***			-0.0492			0.223***			0.00983
			(0.0574)			(0.219)			(0.0628)			(0.265)
Duration abroad	0.00189**	0.00153**	0.00172**	-0.000546	-0.000422	-0.000571	0.00139**	0.0017***	0.00155**	-0.00145	-0.00142	-0.00126
	(0.000824)	(0.000772)	(0.000791)	(0.00141)	(0.00142)	(0.00140)	(0.000652)	(0.000667)	(0.000669)	(0.00214)	(0.00217)	(0.00208)
Duration since abroad	0.000139	4.35e-05	6.43e-05	-0.000406	-0.000614	-0.000387	0.000503	0.000643	0.000621	0.00117	0.000769	0.000637
	(0.000459)	(0.000470)	(0.000454)	(0.00161)	(0.00161)	(0.00160)	(0.000486)	(0.000467)	(0.000482)	(0.00240)	(0.00222)	(0.00228)
Age	-0.0126	-0.0128	-0.0129	0.0575	0.0570	0.0546	0.00677	0.0108	0.00745	-0.0518	-0.0406	-0.0349
	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0115)	(0.0585)	(0.0577)	(0.0573)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0116)	(0.0756)	(0.0688)	(0.0681)
Age squared	0.000181	0.000184	0.000186	-0.000728	-0.000691	-0.000688	-8.53e-05	-0.000144	-9.85e-05	0.000781	0.000639	0.000584
	(0.00014)	(0.00014)	(0.00014)	(0.00066)	(0.00065)	(0.00064)	(0.00014)	(0.00014)	(0.00014)	(0.00085)	(0.00077)	(0.00076)
Remittances	0.0499	0.0195	0.0204	0.110	0.139	0.113	-0.166**	-0.113	-0.126*	-0.398*	-0.391*	-0.380*
	(0.0601)	(0.0612)	(0.0602)	(0.214)	(0.215)	(0.222)	(0.0704)	(0.0699)	(0.0699)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.222)
Place of residence	0.0766	0.0872	0.0989	-0.261	-0.196	-0.230	0.0786	0.0684	0.0638	0.411**	0.381*	0.371*
	(0.0811)	(0.0822)	(0.0824)	(0.276)	(0.278)	(0.268)	(0.0889)	(0.0886)	(0.0896)	(0.196)	(0.208)	(0.216)
	(0.0637)	(0.0656)	(0.0628)	(0.317)	(0.318)	(0.315)	(0.0745)	(0.0715)	(0.0730)	(0.252)	(0.246)	(0.258)

(continued)

Table 3. Continued

	Social relations						Quality of life					
	Africa countries			Other countries			Africa countries			Other countries		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
National language (French)	-0.0365	0.0554	-0.0448	-0.0640	-0.109	-0.0790	-0.0723	0.0225	-0.0413	0.369	0.385	0.374
	(0.0637)	(0.0656)	(0.0628)	(0.317)	(0.318)	(0.315)	(0.0745)	(0.0715)	(0.0730)	(0.252)	(0.246)	(0.258)
National language (English)	-0.224***	0.203***	-0.202**	-0.0302	-0.0134	-0.0211	0.115	-0.114	0.101	-0.0416	-0.0878	-0.0885
	(0.0794)	(0.0690)	(0.0795)	(0.209)	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.0826)	(0.0795)	(0.0828)	(0.237)	(0.218)	(0.220)
Fluent in Beti	-0.209	0.213*	-0.211	-0.276	-0.282	-0.259	0.130	-0.154	0.125	0.0361	0.0325	0.0419
	(0.147)	(0.113)	(0.146)	(0.288)	(0.286)	(0.298)	(0.158)	(0.145)	(0.158)	(0.0746)	(0.0754)	(0.0748)
Fluent in Pidgin	0.154**	-0.199**	0.138**	-0.145	-0.0578	-0.106	0.0793	-0.0912	0.102	0.0204	0.0114	0.0230
	(0.0602)	(0.0987)	(0.0640)	(0.356)	(0.394)	(0.384)	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.0651)	(0.0676)	(0.0651)
Fluent in Fufulbé	0.0690	-0.0812	0.0789	-0.0221	-0.0125	-0.0146	0.00329	-0.0337	0.00734	-0.280	-0.239	-0.234
	(0.0654)	(0.0732)	(0.0648)	(0.0691)	(0.0697)	(0.0699)	(0.0800)	(0.0789)	(0.0797)	(0.369)	(0.427)	(0.463)
Immigrant investment	-0.160**	-0.181**	-0.159**	-0.0778	-0.00603	-0.0635	-0.0312	-0.0233	-0.0223	0.668***	0.658***	0.649***
	(0.0766)	(0.0778)	(0.0765)	(0.277)	(0.308)	(0.295)	(0.0779)	(0.0775)	(0.0777)	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.200)
Immigrant insecurity	0.0622	0.0626	0.0406	-0.331*	-0.360*	-0.330*	0.0500	0.0621	0.0873	-0.500***	-0.499***	-0.498***
	(0.0713)	(0.0715)	(0.0749)	(0.188)	(0.185)	(0.190)	(0.0981)	(0.0959)	(0.0990)	(0.145)	(0.150)	(0.152)
Refugee insecurity	-0.0351	-0.0457	-0.0261	-0.0513	-0.0746	-0.0510	0.188**	0.167*	0.189**	-0.0711	-0.0478	-0.0463
	(0.0795)	(0.0825)	(0.0796)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.239)	(0.0942)	(0.0936)	(0.0933)	(0.289)	(0.297)	(0.305)
Pseudo R^2	0.113	0.134	0.145	0.125	0.135	0.124	0.11	0.093	0.106	0.344	0.341	0.339
Observations	265	265	265	43	43	43	265	265	265	40	40	40

*Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * siginificant at 10%.*

In addition, the work of Stark and Taylor (1989) and Singer and Massey (1998) argues that migrants belong to migrant networks that limit the objective costs of migration. Regarding selection into return, the work of Elmallakh and Wahba (2021) shows that, unlike those who stay abroad, return migrants are usually illegal settlers. More specifically, a distinction is made between temporary migrants (return migrants) and permanent migrants (those who stayed abroad). Gmelch (1980) posits three main reasons for temporary migration. 1) Temporary migrants are those who return after accomplishing objectives abroad. 2) Temporary migrants are those who initially intended to stay abroad but due to external factors are forced to return. 3) Those who return do so because of the failure to adapt in the host country.

Thus, ignoring this selection problem will contribute to overestimating or underestimating the estimated coefficient (Whaba, 2015; Elmallakh and Wahba, 2021). To address these problems of selections, in the empirical literature on return migration, several alternatives are considered. First, some studies primarily correct for one type of selection bias, most commonly that related to return migration (Lacuesta, 2010; Wahba, 2007). Second, other authors use techniques that simultaneously correct for multiple types of selection bias. For example, Wahba (2015) uses a multi-equation mixed system that utilized a Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) estimator which fits a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) simultaneous equation model whereby endogenous regressions appear on the right side of other equations (Wahba, 2015)[8] while Elmallakh and Wahba, (2022)[9] use a CMP model all inspired by Roodman (2011)[10]. Due to the availability of data on migrants left behind and the restrictive nature of the latter two methods, we cannot use them. Similar to previous work on migration, we correct for the selection into migration by drawing on Heckman's (1979) two-stage selection model (Meka'a, 2011)[11].

The decision to migrate M_i, is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the individual has migrated and 0 otherwise. We define an unobserved latent variable M_i^* such as:

$$M_i^* = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z_i + \chi_i \tag{5}$$

where M_i^* is the household migration decision. Z_i the vector that incorporates the individual characteristics of the migrant and the household characteristics. χ_i the error term. The individual characteristics are age, age squared, sex, marital status, place of residence, and education level. Household characteristics are summarized as variables such as ownership of land and livestock. The rationale for the individual and household variables is found in the theoretical and empirical literature. Pioneering work, notably that of Harris and Todaro (1970), assumes that the decision to migrate is an individual decision resulting from behavior that maximizes the migrant's expected income. In contrast, the new economics of labor analyzes migration within

[8] Wahba (2015) simultaneously considers selection into emigration, selection into labor market participation, and selection into return.

[9] Elmallakh and Wahba (2022) consider simultaneously, selection into migration, selection into legal status and selection into return.

[10] The second method has the advantage of solving the endogeneity problem resulting from the simultaneity bias (Elmallakh and Wahba, 2022)

[11] The empirical literature focuses on one particular type of selection, namely: selection into return. The work of Meca'a (2014) focuses on selection into emigration in the case of internal (rural-urban) migration. This study remains relevant in that migration theories are mostly based on microeconomic studies (Todaro, 1980; Zhu, 2002; Schuln, 1982a).

a broader framework that includes the family at the center of decisions (Massey et al., 1993).

In order to correct for selection bias, Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step selection method which consists of estimating the inverse Mills ratio (λ) from equation (5) and including this estimated variable in equation (3)[12]. This equation corrected for selection bias is specified as follows:

$$Y_i^* = \mu + \tau Skills_i + \beta \boldsymbol{X_i} + \delta\lambda_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (6)$$

The results of the selection equation in Table 6 show that age, marital status, gender, education level, and ownership of land affect the probability of migrating. The results show that age negatively affects the probability of migrating. Younger people are much more likely to migrate. These results support the predictions of Sjaastad's (1962) model of human capital migration. Although focused on internal migration, the work of Meca'a (2014) supports these results. These results also show that educational attainment has a significant and negative effect on the probability of migrating. These results are contrary to the literature on international migration that posits brain drain (Bhagwati, 1976; Docquier, 2011). In the case of migration to developed countries, human capital spillovers push migrants to acquire more knowledge before undertaking the migration experience (Kapur and MaHale, 2005). Thus, the negative effect can be explained by the fact that this is a South-South survey. Therefore, most of the migrants came from a southern country. Because the spillover effects of human capital are not the same in these countries, individuals who undertake the migration experience have little incentive to educate themselves. In addition, rather than undertaking wage labor, some people may move for trade, seasonal agriculture, marriage, and more (European Paliament, 2020). In addition to these reasons, natural disasters, extreme weather conditions, or conflict may cause people to move from one country to another (Wesselbaum, 2020). Such migration does not depend on the level of education.

In contrast to females, the results show that males positively and significantly affect the probability of migrating. Similarly, unlike single individuals, marital status positively and significantly affects the probability of migrating. These results may be justified by insights from the new economics of labor migration. Men or people in couples migrate with the objective of maximizing family interests. Finally, ownership of agricultural assets negatively and significantly affects the probability of migrating. This result is consistent with the literature (Meca'a, 2014). One possible explanation is that land ownership in Sub-Saharan African countries is a source of employment, wealth, and livelihood (Meca'a, 2014). Thus, such ownership may deter households from migrating in order to retain their assets.

Table 9 presents the results when we correct for selection bias into emigration. The inverse Mills ratio is significant, indicating that there is a selection problem into emigration. Overall, the results corrected for the selection problem are consistent

[12] In the empirical literature, to instrument emigration, authors most often use the average real oil price for each individual at the age of 25 (Elmallakh and Wahba, 2021) and 26 (Wahba, 2015) in the case of Egypt. The ages used are based on the average age of the returnees in each sample (for reasons for using this indicator see section 4.2). In the case of this study, 46.6% of migrants come mainly from Central Africa (see section 3.1). One of the reasons for this preferred destination in the context of South-South migration may be geographical proximity or the use of the same language. These variables are widely used as instruments of emigration in the macroeconomic literature (Docquier et al., 2011; Coulibaly and Gnimassoun, 2023). Due to the microeconomic nature of this study, we cannot use these variables. Thus, due to the lack of data, as in Meka'a (2011), the first stage of the Heckman selection model will be carried out without instruments.

with those obtained from the simple probit with a few exceptions. Indeed, the results obtained from the simple probit underestimate the coefficients obtained. In the particular case of our variables of interest, when we consider the estimated coefficients in absolute value when correcting for the selection bias linked to emigration, they are 0.342, 0.452 and 0.525 in the case of social relations, respectively with regard to degrees and qualifications, other qualifications and qualifications. In the case of quality of life, these coefficients are 0.485, 0.42 and 0.481 respectively. On the other hand, considering the simple probit, these coefficients are 0.118, 0.16 and 0.176 in the case of social relations and 0.181, 0.138 and 0.173 in the case of quality of life.

CONCLUSION

This article examined for the first time, the effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life in Cameroon. For this purpose, we used original data from a survey carried out in 2012 by IFORD. We use the formal and informal skills acquired abroad by the return migrant. These are materialised by three indicators, namely: new competences as a whole, degrees and qualifications and other qualifications. The main results, based on a probit model, show that formal and informal competences acquired abroad reduce the probability that return migrants improve social relations and increase the likelihood that they will increase quality of life in their home country. These results remain robust to the inclusion of return migrants from African and non-democratic countries. Correcting for the endogeneity of skills acquired abroad by the two-stage probit model with exogenous regressors does not alter our conclusions. Similarly, the correction of the selection bias for emigration using Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure confirms the results obtained from the probit model despite an underestimation of the coefficients estimated by the latter. Overall, our results confirm the hypothesis that migration contributes to the transfer of norms and practices from destination to origin countries.

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Appendix

Table 4. Robustness. Return migrants from democratic countries *versus* return migrants from non-democratic countries (probit model)

	Social relations						Quality of life					
	Democratic countries			Non-democratic countries			Democratic countries			Non-democratic countries		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Degrees and qualifications	-0.175			-0.106			-0.0418			0.266***		
	(0.204)			(0.0719)			(0.203)			(0.0785)		
Other qualifications		-0.0932			-0.126**			0.335*			0.114*	
		(0.182)			(0.0639)			(0.174)			(0.0689)	
Qualifications			0.0154			-0.172***			0.269			0.202***
			(0.205)			(0.0582)			(0.188)			(0.0648)
Duration abroad	0.00100	0.000962	0.000857	0.00176**	0.00148*	0.00177**	-0.000801	-0.00134	-0.00118	0.00141**	0.00178**	0.00160**
	(0.00142)	(0.00145)	(0.00144)	(0.000828)	(0.000773)	(0.000794)	(0.00143)	(0.00150)	(0.00148)	(0.000685)	(0.000710)	(0.000708)
Duration since return	0.00104	0.000892	0.000880	-0.000229	-0.000328	-0.000279	-0.000182	-0.000326	-0.000441	0.000549**	0.000675	0.000663*
	(0.0483)	(0.0475)	(0.0471)	(0.000465)	(0.000470)	(0.000455)	(0.000951)	(0.000937)	(0.000945)	(0.00027)	(0.0449)	(0.000394)
Age	0.00743	0.00304	0.00225	-0.0151	-0.0149	-0.0151	-0.00662	-0.00662	-0.0145	0.00561	0.00669	0.00577
	(0.0483)	(0.0475)	(0.0471)	(0.0118)	(0.0119)	(0.0120)	(0.0450)	(0.0449)	(0.0448)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.0111)
Age squared	-5.96e-05	-6.19e-06	-1.05e-05	0.000230	0.000227	0.000230	0.000106	7.67e-05	0.000179	-5.21e-05	-7.16e-05	-5.77e-05
	(0.00054)	(0.00053)	(0.00052)	(0.00015)	(0.00015)	(0.00015)	(0.00049)	(0.00049)	(0.00049)	(0.00013)	(0.00013)	(0.00013)
Remittances	0.138	0.122	0.0987	-0.0395	-0.00571	-0.00996	-0.118	-0.230	-0.213	0.134*	0.0879	0.0918***
	(0.184)	(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.0618)	(0.0612)	(0.0604)	(0.177)	(0.187)	(0.183)	(0.0723)	(0.0717)	(0.0306)
Place of residence	-0.293	-0.194	-0.204	-0.0820	-0.0938	-0.101	-0.0463	-0.0320	0.0245	-0.0976	-0.0808	-0.0805
	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.217)	(0.0663)	(0.0649)	(0.0628)	(0.248)	(0.229)	(0.228)	(0.0940)	(0.0930)	(0.0940)
National language (French)	0.390*	0.358	0.339	-0.0969	-0.109*	-0.102*	0.413**	0.415*	0.386*	-0.0721	-0.0361	-0.0421
	(0.219)	(0.226)	(0.235)	(0.0600)	(0.0590)	(0.0590)	(0.204)	(0.224)	(0.228)	(0.0749)	(0.0729)	(0.0737)
National language (English)	-0.0289	0.00883	-0.00245	-0.243***	-0.227***	-0.212***	0.155	0.150	0.187	0.0639	0.0760	0.0540
	(0.223)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.0790)	(0.0797)	(0.0790)	(0.199)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.0809)	(0.0802)	(0.0807)
Fluent in Beti	-0.276	-0.269	-0.241	-0.215	-0.255*	-0.215	0.258	0.356	0.315	0.125	0.155	0.124
	(0.261)	(0.266)	(0.269)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.267)	(0.237)	(0.249)	(0.160)	(0.157)	(0.159)
Fluent in Fufuldé	0.477***	0.460***	0.460***	0.0514	0.0577	0.0687	-0.0505	-0.0183	-0.0587	-0.00843	0.00554	-0.00624
	(0.160)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.0680)	(0.0680)	(0.0662)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.246)	(0.0813)	(0.0808)	(0.0810)
Fluent in Fufuldé	0.477***	0.460***	0.460***	0.0514	0.0577	0.0687	-0.0505	-0.0183	-0.0587	-0.00843	0.00554	-0.00624
	(0.160)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.0680)	(0.0680)	(0.0662)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.246)	(0.0813)	(0.0808)	(0.0810)
Fluent in Pidgin	-0.102	-0.0722	-0.118	0.189***	0.184***	0.172***	0.476***	0.487**	0.467**	0.0951	0.0789	0.108
	(0.333)	(0.337)	(0.337)	(0.0490)	(0.0509)	(0.0529)	(0.177)	(0.197)	(0.204)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.120)
Immigrants investment	0.267***	0.233**	-0.238	-0.205***	-0.212***	-0.195**	0.108	0.131	0.154	-0.0280	0.00491	-0.0145
	(0.0445)	(0.112)	(0.234)	(0.0792)	(0.0786)	(0.0786)	(0.250)	(0.248)	(0.240)	(0.0790)	(0.0785)	(0.0786)
Immigrants insecurity	-0.318	-0.359**	-0.365**	0.112*	0.112*	0.0966	-0.0602	-0.136	-0.134	0.00120	-0.0115	0.0158
	(0.195)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.0637)	(0.0637)	(0.0669)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.206)	(0.102)	(0.0995)	(0.103)
Refugee insecurity	0.244	0.229	0.209	-0.0712	-0.0695	-0.0668	-0.193	-0.265	-0.328	0.220**	0.224**	0.231**
	(0.226)	(0.231)	(0.255)	(0.0816)	(0.0819)	(0.0819)	(0.224)	(0.222)	(0.217)	(0.0938)	(0.0912)	(0.0923)
Pseudo R^2	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.21	0.18	0.0109	0.084	0.104
Observations	50	50	50	261	261	261	50	50	50	261	261	261

*Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * siginificant at 10%.*

Table 5. Robustness. Effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life (IV probit)

	Degrees and qualifications	Others qualifications	Qualifications	Social relations			Quality of life		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Involontary return	-0.828*	-0.705***	-0.825**						
	(0.462)	(0.235)	(0.401)						
Fitted degress and qualifications				-0.425**			0.144**		
				(0.214)			(0.072)		
Fitted other qualifications					-0.255**			0.331***	
					(0.128)			(0.082)	
Fitted qualifications						-0.383			0.173***
						(1.505)			(0.034)
Duration abroad	0.00477***	0.00367**	0.00463***	0.00274*	0.00270**	0.00279*	0.00424***	0.00765	0.00476***
	(0.00148)	(0.00157)	(0.00170)	(0.0016)	(0.00135)	(0.0016)	(0.00161)	(0.00546)	(0.00179)
Duration since return	0.00181*	0.000255	0.000721	4.31e-05	2.72e-06	3.90e-05	0.00222**	0.00175	0.00233**
	(0.00108)	(0.00107)	(0.00103)	(0.00120)	(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00111)	(0.00111)	(0.00114)
Age	0.00759	0.00645	-0.00338	0.0117	0.0124	0.0117	0.0220	0.0219	0.0124
	(0.0229)	(0.0217)	(0.0218)	(0.0230)	(0.0231)	(0.0234)	(0.0215)	(0.0271)	(0.0276)
Age squared	-1.70e-05	7.58e-06	0.000159	-0.000199	-0.000210	-0.000199	-0.000248	-0.000281	-0.000140
	(0.00028)	(0.00027)	(0.00028)	(0.00029)	(0.00029)	(0.00030)	(0.00028)	(0.00038)	(0.00034)
Remittances	-0.100	0.509***	0.393**	0.104**	-0.106	0.105***	0.124*	0.138**	0.115***
	(0.173)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.052)	(0.165)	(0.0262)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.028)
Place of residence	-0.261	-0.0721	-0.245	-0.280	-0.271	-0.277	-0.187	-0.119	-0.183
	(0.227)	(0.219)	(0.214)	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.245)	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.224)
National language (French)	0.559***	-0.0697	0.0941	-0.201	-0.193	-0.195	0.0135	0.0726	0.0465
	(0.208)	(0.181)	(0.179)	(0.200)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.181)	(0.176)	(0.178)
National language (English)	0.402*	0.476**	0.491***	-0.605***	-0.607***	-0.604***	0.237	0.172	0.258
	(0.207)	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.186)
Fluent in beti	0.0479	-0.495	0.160	-0.457	-0.471	-0.463	0.743**	0.492	0.737*
	(0.352)	(0.373)	(0.340)	(0.361)	(0.381)	(0.368)	(0.372)	(0.369)	(0.377)
Fluent in fufuldé	0.162	0.103	0.168	0.411*	0.409*	0.411*	0.0117	-0.0410	0.00458
	(0.208)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.195)
Fluent in Pidgin	-0.420	-0.295	-0.337	0.626*	0.600*	0.608**	0.444	0.197	0.344
	(0.337)	(0.275)	(0.271)	(0.322)	(0.308)	(0.310)	(0.304)	(0.277)	(0.288)
Immigrants investment	0.371*	0.185	0.336*	-0.458**	-0.461**	-0.458**	-0.0139	-0.0694	-0.0118
	(0.197)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.191)
Immigrants insecurity	0.0355	-0.0687	-0.281	-0.00929	-0.0220	-0.0147	0.135	0.0147	0.123
	(0.236)	(0.228)	(0.225)	(0.243)	(0.244)	(0.244)	(0.236)	(0.229)	(0.236)
Refugees insecurity	0.340	0.210	0.370*	-0.101	-0.108	-0.102	0.446**	0.365*	0.448**
	(0.217)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.209)	(0.205)	(0.210)
Wald test of exoneity(p-value)	0.62	0.472	0.701						
Pseudo R^2				0.098	0.0986	0.0987	0.05	0.032	0.0496
Observations	311	311	311	311	311	311	311	311	311

*Note: Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * siginificant at 10 %.*

Table 6. Results of estimates of migration by its determinants

Age	-0.0673***
	(0.00912)
Age squared	-0.0771***
	(0.0109)
Marital statut (ref group: single)	0.108*
	(0.0646)
Educational level (ref groupe: none)	
1.Primary	-0.327***
	(0.0954)
2.Secondary	-0.469***
	(0.0948)
3.University	-0.145
	(0.114)
1.Sex (*ref groupe: female*)	0.526***
	(0.0559)
Land	-0.301***
	(0.0594)
Livestock	0.0695
	(0.0732)
1.Place of residence (*ref groupe: Rural*)	0.0562
	(0.0686)
Pseudo R^2	0. 234
Observations	4,004

*Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * siginificant at 10 %.*

Table 7. Spatial deflator in 2014 and villages surveyed by region

Douala	1.044	12
Yaoundé	1	13
Adamaoua	0.936	2
Centre (excluding Yaoundé)	0.99	5
East	0.871	4
Far North	0.963	10
Littoral (excluding Douala)	0.984	5
North	0.994	5
North West	1	8
West	0.88	6
South	1.02	3
South West	0.984	9
Total		82

Source: National Institute of Statistic (2014).

Table 8. Duration abroad

Duration in years	Effective	Percentage	Cumul percentage
Less than 3 monts	216	65.06	65.06
More than 3 years	116	34.93	100
Total	332	100	

Source: Authors.

Table 9. Effect of skills acquired abroad by return migrants on social relations and quality of life (taking into account selection into migration)

	Social relations			Quality of life		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Degrees and qualifications	-0.342*			0.485***		
	(0.18)			(0.176)		
Other qualifications		-0.452***			0.420***	
		(0.170)			(0.158)	
Qualification			-0.525***			0.481***
			(0.169)			(0.156)
Duration abroad	0.00341*	0.00310	0.00356*	0.00244*	0.0043**	0.00257*
	(0.00206)	(0.00196)	(0.00203)	(0.00147)	(0.00215)	(0.00149)
Duration since return	0.000143	-2.74e-05	0.000104	0.00146**	0.00157**	0.00161
	(0.00117)	(0.00118)	(0.00116)	(0.00073)	(0.00078)	(0.00109)
Age	0.00845	0.0111	0.00595	0.0226	0.0214	0.0246
	(0.0289)	(0.0292)	(0.0292)	(0.0270)	(0.0270)	(0.0271)
Age squared	-0.00017	-0.00019	-0.00013	-0.00032	-0.00030	-0.00035
	(0.00034)	(0.00034)	(0.00034)	(0.00032)	(0.00032)	(0.00032)
Remittances	-0.120	-0.0174	-0.0254	0.131**	0.0746*	0.0463*
	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.027)
Place of residence	-0.287	-0.290	-0.328	-0.0485	-0.0860	-0.0405
	(0.235)	(0.237)	(0.239)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.214)
National language (French)	-0.138**	-0.2***	-0.169	0.0126	0.0659	0.0727
	(0.069)	(0.05)	(0.201)	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.179)
National language (English)	-0.576***	-0.530***	-0.517***	0.160	0.104	0.132
	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.187)
Fluent in Beti	-0.512	0.589*	-0.507	0.504	0.528	0.487
	(0.332)	(0.331)	(0.335)	(0.342)	(0.336)	(0.343)
Fluent in Fufuldé	0.440**	0.450**	0.479**	-0.0655	-0.0647	-0.0590
	(0.219)	(0.221)	(0.223)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.194)
Fluent in Pidgin	0.540*	0.520*	0.494*	0.244	0.215	0.263
	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.271)	(0.270)	(0.274)
Immigrants investment	-0.438**	-0.447**	-0.424**	-0.121	-0.1000	-0.122
	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.190)	(0.188)	(0.190)
Immigrants insecurity	-0.0300	-0.0462	-0.0857	-0.0174	0.0110	0.0420
	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.229)	(0.221)	(0.219)	(0.221)
Refugees insecurity	-0.0849	-0.0826	-0.0437	0.332	0.324	0.325
	(0.212)	(0.214)	(0.217)	(0.206)	(0.203)	(0.206)
Mills ratio	0.943*	0.148**	0.347**	0.327**	0.359*	0.311
	(0.497)	(0.029)	(0.1735)	(0.1721)	(0.199)	(0.720)
Pseudo R^2	0.107	0.117	0.124	0.063	0.049	0.067
Observations	311	311	311	311	311	311

*Note : Values in brackets are robust standard errors. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5 % and * siginificant at 10 %.*

Les effets sur les relations sociales et la qualité de vie des compétences acquises à l'étranger par les migrants de retour au Cameroun

Résumé - Cet article vient combler le manque de travaux sur le lien entre la migration de retour et la cohésion sociale dans le pays d'origine des migrants. Ainsi, nous évaluons l'effet des compétences acquises à l'étranger par les migrants de retour sur les relations sociales et la qualité de vie au Cameroun en utilisant des données d'enquête originales de l'Institut de formation et de recherche démographiques. Les principaux résultats, basés sur un modèle probit, montrent que les compétences formelles et informelles acquises à l'étranger réduisent la probabilité que les migrants de retour améliorent les relations sociales et augmentent la probabilité qu'ils améliorent la qualité de vie dans leur pays d'origine. Ces résultats restent robustes à l'inclusion des migrants de retour provenant de pays africains et non démocratiques. La correction de l'endogénéité des compétences acquises à l'étranger par un modèle probit à deux niveaux avec variables instrumentales ne modifie pas ces conclusions. De même, la correction du biais de sélection à l'émigration à partir de la procédure de Heckman (1979) en deux étapes conforte les résultats obtenus à partir du modèle probit. Nos résultats semblent corroborer l'hypothèse selon laquelle la migration contribue au transfert de normes et de pratiques des pays de destination vers les pays d'origine.

Mots-clés

Retour des migrants
Compétences
Relations sociales
Qualité de vie
Cameroun