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Gender Analysis of the Corruption and Youth Unemployment Nexus in African Countries: A Dynamic Panel Threshold Approach

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Abstract – This paper aims to assess the nonlinear effects of corruption on male and female youth unemployment in a sample of 33 African countries over the period 2002–2021. Using the dynamic panel threshold model developed by Kremer et al. (2013), the results show the existence of a nonlinear relationship between control of corruption and youth unemployment for both men and women. Control of corruption has positive (negative) effects on the youth unemployment rate when corruption thresholds are below (above) -1.03 for young men's unemployment rate and -0.48 for young women's unemployment rate. The negative thresholds indicate that anti-corruption measures are insufficient to reduce the unemployment rate, particularly among young women. Moreover, in countries with low corruption rates, an increase in the control of corruption score by one point reduces the youth unemployment rate by 0.48 percentage points for young men and by 1.61 percentage points for young women. In order to better combat youth unemployment, the governments of African countries should strive to improve the quality of their institutions and achieve better governance capable of reducing corruption.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Globally, there is continuing interest in the relationship between gender-based corruption and youth unemployment. Gender-based corruption refers to the impact of corruption on persons depending on their gender, with women often being disproportionately affected. Unemployment, on the other hand, refers to a lack of job possibilities for people in the labour force. These two challenges cross in a variety of ways, most notably in how corruption can worsen existing gender discrepancies in unemployment rates and impede women's access to economic possibilities. These dynamics are frequently amplified in the African environment due to a variety of socioeconomic and cultural reasons. Many African countries face significant levels of corruption and unemployment, and these issues combine with gender inequities to generate a slew of socioeconomic issues.

The United Nations estimates that 19.3 % of the population of African countries is between the ages of 15 and 24 years old, making these nations home to the world's youngest populations. In addition, the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2022) forecasts that the global youth participation rate in 2022 will be 43.9%. This rate is 46.9% for men, but it is just 40.9 % for women. In 2022, the unemployment rates for male and female youths reached 12.7 % and 12.3 %, respectively. For all male and female youths combined, the overall rate was 13.3 %. Numerous African nations are confronted with chronically high rates of youth unemployment, with young people typically facing greater rates of unemployment compared to other age groups. The gender youth unemployment gap is confirmed to exist in several African countries by the fact that the jobless rate of young women is higher than that of young males. For instance, the youth unemployment rate (% of the total labor force between the ages of 15 and 24) will be 51.5 % in South Africa in 2022 (48.5% for men and 55.55% for women), 39.8 % in Namibia (38.9% for men and 40.95% for women), 37.8 % in Botswana (36.9% for men and 39.15% for women), 37.1 % in Tunisia (35.9% for men and 39.95% for women), and 36% (ILO, 2022).

Furthermore, the informal sector is considered as the main engine of employment in Africa. According to the International Labor organization (ILO, 2018), 85.8 % of employment is informal. Also, informal sector is a greater source of employment for women (89.7 percent of employed women are in informal sector compared to 82.7% of men) and youth (informal sector employs 94,9% of persons aged between 15 and 24 years). The size of the informal sector is the strongest "predictor" of state corruption (ILO, 2009). Corruption can have a significant impact on unemployment in the sense that corrupt practices lead to a mismanagement of economic resources which can lead to a lack of public investment in infrastructure and consequently deter national and foreign investment. Thus, economic growth will be hampered, and job opportunities decrease.

In addition to higher rates of youth unemployment, widespread corruption in African countries has been identified as a significant hurdle to economic growth and development. This is because corruption is endemic in African countries. It makes

investment more difficult, it messes with the dynamics of the market, and it makes the delivery of public services less effective. According to the Corruption Perception Index (2022), five of the ten countries in the world that are deemed to have the highest levels of corruption are located in Africa. Because of this, young people may have difficulty gaining access to high-quality educational and training options, which reduces their marketability to potential employers and, as a result, raises the rate of youth unemployment.

African nations confront three primary obstacles in regard to accomplishing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)[1] set forth by the United Nations: high rates of youth unemployment, gender-based inequality, and inadequate levels of institutional quality. To overcome these difficulties, the governments of Africa should prioritize improving the quality of the continent's institutions to guarantee effective governance. The importance of institutions in the fight against corruption has been highlighted in several studies (Saha et al., 2009; Treisman, 2007). In fact, the institutional effectiveness of a nation is invariably the primary driving force behind economic expansion and, consequently, employment. According to Kaufmann (2005), "governance is a luxury that only affluent countries can afford," and greater governance is related to higher levels of economic growth. Additionally, Kaufmann asserted that "governance is a luxury that only rich countries can afford." Efficiency in government and the quality of regulations both contribute to increased economic growth (Méon and Weill, 2005; Mustafa and Jamil, 2018; Hall and Jones, 1999; Mustafa and Jamil, 2018; Hall and Jones, 1999; Mustafa and Jamil, 2018; Hall and Jones, 1999). In a similar vein, Memon et al. (2019) considered that strong governance fostered economic growth because it was supported by quality institutions. However, poor governance fosters corruption, which, in turn, lowers the quality of government and slows the rate of economic progress (Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009). As a direct consequence of this, there is an increase in the rate of unemployment, particularly among young people and skilled professionals (Schneider, 2015; Bouzid, 2016).

The negative impact of corruption on economic growth and so as on employment level can be showed through numerous channels. Corruption is harmful for domestic and foreign investment leading to a decrease in job opportunities for citizens. Mauro and Driscoll (1997) considered that corruption reduces investment incentives and hinders job creation. In the same line, Wei (2000) stated that corruption impedes foreign direct investment because it is the synonym of an additional tax. Thus, corruption which slowdowns foreign direct investment inflows restraints job creation. In addition, corruption leads to tax evasion (Toke,2003) which reduces government revenues necessary to finance public expenditures and consequently decreases job creation. Mauro (2004) concluded that corruption is associated with a vicious cycle of low economic growth. Corruption is also followed by a decreases of labor productivity (Cooray and Dzhumashev, 2018) which can decline labor demand and thereby increases unemployment. Recently, Kirsanli

[1] 17 Goals: Sustainable Development (un.org).

(2023) and Fagbemi et al. (2023) affirmed that corruption hampers economic growth and raises unemployment.

Investigating the effects of corruption on youth unemployment by gender is crucial for promoting inclusive and equitable policymaking, understanding labor market dynamics, and advancing gender equality in society. It can lead to more informed decisions and targeted interventions aimed at addressing the specific challenges faced by young men and women in the labor market.

Examining the effects of corruption on youth unemployment by gender is essential for several reasons. First, the African labor market is characterized by significant gender disparities (Arbache et al., 2010). Thus, understanding how corruption affects youth unemployment differently for males and females can help policymakers identify and address gender-specific challenges and implement targeted and inclusive policies to tackle youth unemployment (Brixiová et al., 2021). Second, examining the gender-specific effects of corruption on youth unemployment can shed light on potential disparities in educational opportunities and their consequences on labor market outcomes (Gupta et al., 2002). Indeed, corruption may lead to gender discriminatory hiring practices. Therefore, identifying and examining these dynamics can be useful to promote gender equality in the labor market and consequently lead to the realization of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

There has been a significant amount of research conducted on Africa's youth unemployment problem. For example, Brixiová and Kangoye (2014) brought attention to the challenges that young employees in Swaziland experience when trying to find employment in the labor market. In Kenya, Escudero and Mourelo (2014) were interested in the macroeconomic and microeconomic factors that contribute to high rates of youth unemployment and inactivity. Anyanwu (2016) conducted research on the primary elements that contribute to gender equality in the workplace among young people. However, only a small number of studies (Abé Ndjié et al., 2019; Adjor and Kebalo, 2018) have examined the link that exists between youth unemployment and corruption in African countries.

In addition, the link between youth unemployment and corruption in terms of gender has received a disproportionately small amount of attention. None of the earlier studies examined the nonlinear effects of corruption; rather, these studies focused on studying the link between youth unemployment and corruption using a linear, static, or dynamic panel structure.

Unlike previous studies, we investigate the relationship between corruption and unemployment by considering the control of corruption rather than the level of corruption. A high control of corruption score is indicative of good governance which, all ceteris paribus, can reduce youth unemployment. More specifically, we assess to what extent government efforts to control corruption are helpful in reducing unemployment among young men and women. To do this, it would be

useful to determine the threshold from which the control of corruption can reduce the youth unemployment rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the nonlinear relationship between the control of corruption and youth unemployment on a gendered level in African nations. The nonlinearity implies that the control of corruption has a specific regime impact on youth unemployment. Specifically, the control of corruption may reduce youth unemployment when it reaches a certain level. Thus, below the threshold, the government effort in term of control of corruption is not sufficient to reduce youth unemployment. Determining the threshold of the control of corruption from which the control of corruption becomes youth employment- enhancing is helpful for African policymakers to establish appropriate policies in order to achieve the – benchmarking – score of the control of corruption which can reduce youth unemployment both for men and women.

The research conducted by Abé Ndjié and colleagues (2019), who investigated the effects of governance indicators (including the prevention of corruption) on youth unemployment in Africa, is the one that is most relevant to our own work. Nevertheless, Abé Ndjié et al. (2019) failed to consider the gender dimension. In addition, they did not determine the threshold of corruption below which the negative corruption impacts on youth employment start to diminish. The rationale behind using a threshold panel model to examine the effects of corruption on youth unemployment lies in the belief that the relationship between corruption and youth unemployment may not be linear and could exhibit different patterns at different levels of corruption. In the empirical literature on the topic of youth unemployment in African countries, our research makes a contribution that helps fill this gap.

Using a dynamic threshold panel model and a sample of 33 African nations over the period of 2002–2020, this study investigates the dynamic threshold effect that the control of corruption has on youth unemployment. Specifically, it focuses on the threshold at which the effect becomes significant. In addition, it investigates the gender dynamic in relation to youth unemployment and the control of corruption. We make use of the control of corruption (CC) indicator, which is one of the six governance indicators that were presented by Kaufmann et al. (2010), to determine how much of an impact the control of corruption has on youth unemployment rates in African countries, both for young men and young women. Additionally, we incorporate the other five additional governance variables to ensure the validity of our findings[2].

The empirical results point to the possibility of the existence of a threshold effect of the prevention of corrupt practices on the rates of youth unemployment, and this applies to both male and female. In addition, the analysis indicates that there are threshold effects of government effectiveness, political stability, and voice and accountability indicators on the employment of young African people.

[2] The remaining five governance indicators are: government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), political stability (PS), and voice and accountability (VA). Each indicator falls somewhere between a range of -2.5 to 2.5. (a lower value means that there is worse governance).

The remaining parts of the paper are divided into the following sections. The connection between corruption and youth joblessness is examined in Section 2, which offers a concise summary of the topic. The data and the methods are presented in Section 3. The empirical findings are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 draws conclusions and shows how our research might be useful for policy makers to tackle corruption and improve African youth employment.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical foundations for the linkage between corruption and youth unemployment are rooted in various economic, socio-political, and sociocultural concepts. Understanding these foundations helps to elucidate how corruption exacerbates youth unemployment and hampers economic development. Two key theoretical perspectives that contribute to this understanding are the "vicious cycle of corruption" and the "institutional theory."

The vicious cycle of corruption helps to explain the intricate relationship between corruption and youth unemployment. Corruption not only undermines economic growth and job creation but also weakens the institutions necessary for addressing youth unemployment effectively (Boly and Gillanders, 2023). Breaking this cycle requires comprehensive efforts to combat corruption, strengthen institutions, invest in education and skills development, and promote a conducive environment for economic growth. By understanding these theoretical foundations, policymakers can take more targeted and effective actions to tackle both corruption and youth unemployment.

The institutional theory suggests that the quality of institutions and governance within a society significantly influences economic outcomes, including unemployment rates and corruption levels. Indeed, High levels of corruption indicate weak institutions and governance. Such weak institutions often fail to provide a conducive environment for economic growth and job creation (Pillay, 2014). Weak institutions that tolerate corruption tend to fail in addressing youth unemployment effectively. Thus, weak institutions that tolerate corruption can perpetuate youth unemployment by obstructing reforms and policies aimed at fostering economic growth and reducing unemployment (Pillay and Kluvers, 2014).

In addition, corruption is associated with slower economic development and a greater unemployment rate. Governance and institutional quality are significant determinants of economic growth and employment; corruption, which represents the inefficiency of institutional and government systems, impedes economic growth and raises unemployment (Kirsanli, 2023; Fagbemi et al., 2023). The economic effectiveness of governments is diminished by corrupt activities, which refer to the mismanagement of scarce economic resources. Corruption has a negative impact on the quality and composition of government expenditures, to the detriment of critical areas such as health and education (Mauro, 1998).

Corruption is of interest to economic authorities due to its detrimental influence on important macroeconomic variables. It is a significant barrier to obtaining more economic growth and development (Memon et al., 2019). Its indirect consequences on employment can be recognized. Indeed, pervasive corruption can cause a vicious cycle of low economic growth (Mauro, 2004). It has numerous negative effects across multiple pathways that hinder economic growth and, consequently, labor market results. Corruption, for instance, not only reduces investment and restrains economic growth (Mauro and Driscoll, 1997) but also diminishes investment incentives and impedes job creation. Moreover, it reduces investment through the lowered productivity of the nation's infrastructure and the lowered productivity of public investment (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). In a similar vein, Everett et al. (2007) found that corruption increases the cost of public infrastructure projects and undermines the rule of law.

In addition, corruption harms a nation's competitiveness. It equates to a substantial levy on foreign investors (Kaufmann, 2005). Wei (2000) stated that corruption acts as an additional tax that hinders foreign direct investment. Wei (2000) examined the influence of corruption on foreign direct investment in a sample of twelve source countries and 45 host countries, and he concluded that a host country's ability to attract foreign direct investment decreases as its corruption level rises. Foreign investors are deterred and less likely to invest in a highly corrupt environment because corruption raises the cost of investment. Considering that a number of empirical studies have demonstrated the positive impact of foreign direct investments on employment (Karlsson et al., 2009; Vacaflores, 2011; Bakkalci and Argin, 2013), we can conclude that corruption impedes foreign direct investment inflows, thereby discouraging the creation of jobs on the local labor market.

Indicators of labor market corruption include the distribution of jobs based on political ties rather than qualifications (Shneider, 2015). The phenomenon of nepotism toward those who are willing to pay bribes or are close to the boss, regardless of their qualifications, promotes brain drain from a corrupt country (Dimant et al., 2013; Cooray and Schneider, 2016). Due to favouritism and corruption, skilled workers are unable to obtain employment. Therefore, individuals could be regarded as outsiders in the job market, which results in an increase in their unemployment rate. Schneider (2015) referenced the same evidence to support his conclusion that nepotism reduces returns on human capital, slows economic growth, and increases the unemployment rate for qualified people. The dynamic relationship between corruption and unemployment was investigated by Bouzid (2016). He discovered that corruption increases youth and educated job seekers' unemployment rates. Fagbemi et al. (2023) found that corruption and unemployment are cyclically interrelated in the Nigerian labor market. It validated the notion that a high level of corruption inhibits employment growth. On the other hand, they believed that, in the absence of sufficient employment possibilities, job seekers are compelled to pay, thus promoting corruption.

Corruption also affects the availability of labor. Cooray and Dzhumashev (2018) stated that corruption has a detrimental impact on labor supply because it decreases productivity, raises the tax burden, and expands the shadow economy. The decline in productivity reduces economic growth and, consequently, labor demand leading to more unemployment. In addition, a considerable portion of the labor population will leave the formal economy and seek employment in the shadow economy if formal sector positions are mostly offered to those who are willing to pay bribes. When the shadow economy expands, tax revenues decline, which hinders public investment and job development. In addition, the higher the weight of the shadow economy in a country, the higher the unemployment rate (Dell'Anno and Solomon, 2008; Adjor and Kebalo, 2018).

Toke (2003) argues that corruption increases tax evasion and has an effect on capital accumulation, which decreases economic development potential. Thus, corruption practices inhibit job generation. Corruption can be viewed as an impediment to entry into the labor market, particularly when recruitment is based on nepotism rather than labor productivity. In this situation, the labor force participation rate may decline, particularly if workers refuse or are unable to pay bribes.

Corruption has various negative consequences on economic growth and employment via multiple channels. Nonetheless, the relationship between corruption and employment remains unclear. Indeed, a number of studies have indicated that corruption can stimulate economic expansion (Lui, 1985; Bardhan, 1997; Egger and Winner, 2005). In this instance, corruption, which promotes economic expansion, could reduce unemployment. This uncertainty between corruption and employment is the driving force behind our paper. The literature on corruption and unemployment in African countries is vast (Abé Ndjié et al., 2019; Adjor and Kebalo, 2018; Nelson and Ayawei, 2020; Fagbemi et al., 2023), but the effect of corruption on youth unemployment has not been extensively researched.

To our knowledge, our study is the first to address the gender distinctive effects of the control of corruption on youth unemployment in Africa. Because of the different effects that the control of corruption has on men and women, it is extremely important to investigate the gender differences that exist in the relationship between corruption and unemployment. There is a correlation between gender disparity and corruption, which might result in distinct consequences for each gender. Several studies (e.g., Debski et al., 2018; Eswarappa, 2021; Merkle,2020; Urmiche Diya Lipoko, 2021) have been conducted to investigate whether women have different perspectives on corruption compared to men. These studies have highlighted the significance of comprehending these differences. Furthermore, gender discrepancies in education and employment might contribute to a wage disparity between men and women, which further emphasizes the necessity of conducting research on the ways in which corruption affects unemployment in a manner that is distinct for men and women.

Significant gender disparities in education and professional formation are prevalent in African countries, with corruption in the educational sector exacerbating these inequalities and limiting women's access to qualified jobs. Sectoral differences also explain these disparities. African women often work in specific economic sectors like agriculture, retail, and information, which can be negatively impacted by corruption, hindering their income and career progression. Besides, sexism and power abuse are the main risks that women face restricting their access to formal sector. Finally, cultural norms and gender roles can influence how corruption is perceived and experienced by men and women, as well as their ability to denounce or resist corruption.

Few studies have examined the correlation between corruption and youth unemployment in African countries (Abé Ndjié et al., 2019; Adjor and Kebalo, 2018). These studies did not, however, evaluate the impact of corruption on the gender-based young unemployment gap. Furthermore, it is plausible that the relationship between corruption and employment is nonlinear in the sense that corruption deters employment above a certain threshold. Corruption, as a pervasive social problem, has long been recognized as detrimental to economic development and societal welfare. However, its consequences on youth unemployment may not be linear but rather exhibit nonlinear dynamics. This means that corruption's influence on youth unemployment may remain relatively insignificant until it reaches a critical point or threshold, beyond which its impact becomes more pronounced. Identifying this threshold level is essential for policymakers and researchers aiming to implement effective strategies to combat both corruption and youth unemployment. By understanding when corruption starts significantly affecting youth employment prospects, policymakers can develop targeted interventions that address underlying causes and ensure sustainable economic growth and opportunities for young individuals. In our paper, we try to assess, to what extent, efforts made by the governments of African countries, in terms of tackling corruption, promote youth employment. It is possible that the control of corruption can only promote youth employment above a certain threshold. To our knowledge, no study has examined the impact of the control of corruption on the gender gap in youth unemployment in the African region. This study evaluates the threshold effects of the control corruption score on the male and female youth unemployment rate to fill this research gap.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Data and preliminary analysis

We used annual data for a sample of 33 African countries over the period spanning from 2002 to 2020. Table A1 in the Appendix provides the list of countries included in the study. The data include the total (YUR), male (YUR^M) and female (YUR^W) youth unemployment rates collected from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The six governance indicators of Kauffman

et al. (2010) are retrieved from the World Governance Indicators site[3]. The six governance indicators are control of corruption (CC), government efficiency (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), political stability (PS), and voice and accountability (VA). The data include additional control variables such as GDP growth ($GDPG$), inflation rate ($INFR$), percentage of population aged between 0 and 14 years (Pop 0-14), and human capital index (HC). The time series of $GDPG$, $INFR$, and POP 0-14 are collected from the World Bank Indicators (WDI), while the HC is retrieved from the Penn World Table PWT 10.0 database[4].

In the late 1990s, the World Bank and its research department initiated a long-running research program on governance indicators. In fact, at that time, there was no measure that allowed a global comparison of governance or corruption. Kaufman et al. (2010) developed six indicators to measure "good governance", which are called the "World Indicators of Governance." Starting in 1996, the data pertaining to these indicators were made available every two years, and since 2002, the data have been made available annually. The “World Governance Indicators” bring together six dimensions of “good governance”: (1) control of corruption, (2) government effectiveness, (3) regulatory quality, (4) rule of law, (5) political stability, and (6) voice and accountability. The score estimator for each indicator ranges from -2.5 to +2.5. Bad governance is associated with a lower level of governance indicator, implying less effort towards good governance.

The additional macroeconomic variables are defined as follows.

GDPG: according to Okun’s Law and to the employment-production relationship, real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are negatively correlated. In addition, several studies have confirmed the negative relationship between GDP and youth unemployment (Bruno et al., 2017; Bayrak and Tatli, 2016).

INFR: inflation is expected to have an inverse relationship with unemployment. In conformity with Phillips’s curve and studies in the field (Arslan and Zaman, 2014), higher inflation (demand-pull) leads to a lower unemployment rate.

HC: the human capital index ranges from 1 (low return to education) to 5 (high return to education). It is expected to have a positive effect on employment. In other words, an increase in human capital investment reduces the unemployment rate (Izedonmi and Urhie, 2005). In addition, with a low level of human capital, youth could experience long-term unemployment (Muller, 2005). However, the accumulation of human capital can have an adverse effect on youth unemployment mainly when there is a mismatch between job opportunities in formal sector and youth's skills (Kuepié et al., 2009). Moreover, Examining the impact of education on

[3] WGI 2022 Interactive > Home (worldbank.org)
[4] The human capital index estimate is based on the average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) and the rate of return to education from Psacharopoulos (1994). For more details, see PWT 9.0, PWT earlier releases, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen(rug.nl)

labor market outcomes in the two largest cities of the Republic of Congo, Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, Kuepié and Nordman (2016) concluded that returns to education is heterogeneous and varies across cities and institutional sectors.

POP 0-14: the share of the population in the age group of 0 to 14 years has a positive effect on youth unemployment. The greater the proportion of the population aged 0–14 years is, the higher the youth unemployment rate is (Bruno et al., 2014).

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
YUR	18.01	15.05	0.47	60.43
YUR^M	14.25	11.66	0.68	55.69
YUR^W	20.49	17.53	0.16	66.71
GDPG	1.53	3.83	-36.56	15
INFR	7.06	10.2	-8.48	150.32
HC	1.8	0.44	1.05	2.94
POP 0-14	40.65	6.8	16.78	50.43
CC	-0.54	0.53	-1.55	1.24
GE	-0.6	0.55	-1.89	1.16
RQ	-0.5	0.52	-1.65	1.2
RL	-0.54	0.55	-1.84	1.02
PS	-0.56	0.85	-2.7	1.12
VA	-0.55	0.66	-1.86	1.01

Note: YUR, YUR^M, YUR^W, are the youth unemployment rates for total population, men and women. Corruption control (CC), government efficiency (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), political stability (PS) and voice and accountability (VA) are the governance indicators.

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. We observe that the average female youth unemployment rate is higher than that of males. Moreover, some African countries have recorded high unemployment rates, with a maximum of 55.69% and 66.71% for males and females, respectively. South Africa is the country with the highest male and female youth unemployment rates, while Rwanda and Nigeria have the lowest female (1.86%) and male (1.39%) unemployment rates, respectively. GDP growth varies between -36.56% and 15%, with an average of 1.53%, suggesting that most African countries have recorded positive economic growth. Regarding inflation rates, African countries have experienced high episodes of inflation. The minimum inflation rate is -8.4%, while the highest inflation rate is approximately 150%. The average human capital index is 1.8. The maximum value of this index is 2.94, whereas the minimum value is 1.05. Additionally, Table 1 shows that the African population is young. Indeed, the population aged between 0 and 14 years represents, on average, 40.65% of the total population. Regarding the six governance indicators, the average control of corruption is negative (-0.55), suggesting that less significant effort towards good anti-corruption practices is achieved by African countries. Indeed, only five out of 33 African countries have attained positive control of corruption scores. The correlation coefficients varied between 2% and 59%, suggesting moderate correlations between the dependent

variables (youth unemployment rates) and the independent variables (control and government indicator variables) and, hence, rejecting multicollinearity issues.

In addition, it is important to check the cross-sectional dependence (CD) to overcome the estimator's inefficiency as well as the test estimates inconsistency. Column 2 of Table 2 reports the result of the Pesaran (2004) CD test, which suggests that we cannot accept the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence for the majority of variables except the Control of Corruption (CC), Government Efficiency (GE), and Rule of Law (RL) indicators. Therefore, we examine the integration order of the variables using the Pesaran (2007) panel cross-sectional dependence unit root test (CPIS). The results of CPIS tests suggest that the three youth unemployment rates (YUR, YUR^M, and YUR^W) are first-difference stationary and that the remaining variables are stationary.

Table 2. Result of panel cross-sectional dependence and unit root tests

	CD test	CPIS-test Level	CPIS-test First Diff.
YUR	8.5885***	-1.50195	-3.14752***
YUR^M	11.84667***	-1.56723	-3.15321***
YUR^W	7.301950***	-1.63111	-2.84188***
GDPG	20.07567***	-3.43050***	
INFR	20.71168***	-3.21286***	
HC	92.07864***	-3.68647***	
POP	53.97499***	-3.61217***	
CC	-1.65333*	-3.71617***	
GE	-0.949896	-2.20455**	
RQ	6.580222***	-2.06703*	
RL	-1.52283	-2.83325***	
PS	3.18956***	-2.58008***	
VA	-0.79059	-2.77583***	

Note. (***), (**) and (*) indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. YUR, YUR^M, YUR^W, are the youth unemployment rates for total population, men, and women, respectively. Corruption control (CC), government efficiency (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), political stability (PS) and voice and accountability (VA) are the governance indicators. CD test and CPIs-test are the Pesran (2004) cross-section independence, and Pesaran (2007) panel cross-sectional dependance unit root tests, respectively.

3.2. Methodology

To identify the threshold effects of the control of corruption indicator on youth unemployment, we rely on a dynamic threshold panel approach that includes 33 African countries. The use of panel data has the advantage of accounting for specific, unobservable individual characteristics. Since many economic relations are by nature dynamic and subject to structural changes, a dynamic panel threshold model is the most suitable framework in this context. Moreover, the threshold panel model provides a flexible and powerful framework for exploring the complex and potentially nonlinear relationship between the control of corruption and youth unemployment. It allows us to capture country-specific and time-varying effects,

identify critical thresholds, and derive policy recommendations tailored to different levels of corruption.

Therefore, we employ the strategy that Kremer et al. (2013) used. They extended Hansen's (1999) panel threshold model by combining the cross-sectional threshold model of Caner and Hansen (2004) and the generalized moment method (GMM)-type estimators introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995). The advantages of this method include controlling for the endogeneity of significant explanatory variables and estimating threshold values endogenously rather than exogenously as required by Hansen (1999). Moreover, the introduction of Arellano and Bover's (1995) forward orthogonal deviation transformation ensures that the error terms remain uncorrelated. Accordingly, we estimate the following dynamic panel threshold model:

$$YUR_{it}^{M} = \alpha_i^{M} + \theta^{M}\, YUR_{it-1}^{M} + \beta_1^{M} CC_{it}\, I(CC_{it} \le \gamma^{M}) + \beta_2^{M} CC_{it}\, I(CC_{it} > \gamma^{M}) + \delta^{M} X_{it} + u_{it}^{M} \quad (1)$$

$$YUR_{it}^{W} = \alpha_i^{W} + \theta^{W}\, YUR_{it-1}^{W} + \beta_1^{W} CC_{it}\, I(CC_{it} \le \gamma^{W}) + \beta_2^{W} CC_{it}\, I(CC_{it} > \gamma^{W}) + \delta^{W} X_{it} + u_{it}^{W} \quad (2)$$

where YUR_{it}^{M} and YUR_{it}^{W} are the male and female youth unemployment rates, respectively; $i = 1, \cdots, N$ is the country index, $t = 1, \cdots, T$ is the time index, CC_{it} is the control of corruption, and u_{it} is the error term. The vector of exogenous variables X_{it} is considered uncorrelated with u_{it}, while the lagged gender youth unemployment rate is considered correlated with u_{it}. The parameters γ^{M} and γ^{W} are the threshold values of the control of corruption for male and female samples, respectively.

To estimate the dynamic panel threshold model in Eqs. (1) and (2), Kremer et al. (2013) used Arellano and Bover's (1995) forwards orthogonal deviation transformation to eliminate the fixed effects; thereby, Caner and Hansen's (2004) cross-sectional estimation conditions are fulfilled. Accordingly, one can first derive a reduced form estimator of the endogenous variable YUR_{it}^{M} (YUR_{it}^{w}). Second, one should replace YUR_{it}^{M} (YUR_{it}^{w}) with its estimated value and then estimate Eqs. (1), and (2) by least squares (LS) for a fixed threshold γ^{M} (γ^{W}). Finally, one should derive an LS consistent estimator of the threshold $\hat{\gamma}^{M}$ ($\hat{\gamma}^{w}$) and apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the parameters of the dynamic panel threshold model in Eqs. (1) and (2)[5].

To test the null hypothesis $H_0: \beta_1 = \beta_1$ (absence of threshold effects of corruption on youth employment) against the alternative hypothesis $H_0: \beta_1 \neq \beta_1$ (there are threshold effects of corruption on youth employment), we make use of Hansen's (1999) bootstrapped likelihood ratio test defined as follows:

$$SupWstar = \frac{S_0 - S_1(\hat{\gamma})}{\hat{\sigma}^2}$$

[5] Additionally, the critical values determining the 95% confidence interval for the threshold are derived following the procedure's estimation of Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004).

where S_0 and $S_1(\hat{\gamma})$ are the residual sum of squares of the model under the null and alternative hypotheses, respectively.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

4.1. Gender youth unemployment and control of corruption

Table 3 provides the estimation results of the relationship between the control of corruption and the male, and female youth unemployment rates. For all groups, we find a significant positive effect of the lagged value of the youth unemployment rate on the current youth unemployment rate in Africa. The autoregressive model reflects its persistent character for both young men and women and the lagged effects of the explanatory variables considered. This result supports the use of a dynamic panel model. Moreover, for all regressions, the estimation results indicate that the estimated threshold levels of control of corruption are statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting the existence of regime-dependent effects of the control of corruption on youth unemployment. Results of the cross-sectional dependence tests of Pesaran (2004) fail to reject the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence in the error terms of the dynamic panel threshold regressions.

The control of the corruption variable exerts a threshold effect on male youth unemployment, supporting the nonlinear relationship between the two variables. The estimated threshold level is approximately -1.03. Once the control corruption index exceeds the estimated threshold, its coefficient turns out to be negative and statistically significant. Hence, the control corruption index is found to boost the male youth employment rate only in the upper regime. Indeed, above the threshold level, an increase in the control of the corruption index by 1 point decreases the unemployment of male youth by 0.48 percentage point.

For the female population, the estimated threshold value of the control of corruption is (-0.478), which is higher than that estimated for young men (-1.03). The estimated threshold effect of corruption is statistically significant only in regime 2, with a value of -1.61. In other words, when the control of the corruption score jumps above (-0.478), the youth unemployment rate among women decreases. In fact, an increase in the control of corruption index by 1 point decreases female youth unemployment by approximately 1.61 %. These results indicate that the effect of corruption on unemployment is more pronounced among women than among men. On the one hand, the control of corruption estimated threshold value for the population of young women is higher than that for the population of young men. Indeed, women may face discrimination in regard to hiring and will sometimes be forced to pay bribes to obtain a job. On the other hand, we note that the estimated effects of the control of corruption on unemployment are much stronger for young women than for young men. Thus, any increases in the control of corruption score will have a greater positive effect on the employment of women than on that of men.

Table 3. Results of the threshold effect of control of corruption on gender youth unemployment rate

Estimates	Dependent variable	
	Male (YUR^M)	Female (YUR^W)
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_1$	0.867**	3.080***
	(0.327)	(0.628)
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_2$	-0.481*	-1.605*
	(0.359)	(0.543)
Lag_dependent	0.771***	0.679***
	(0.010)	(0.015)
GDPG	-0.112***	-0.199 ***
	(0.010)	(0.011)
INFR	0.030***	-0.014**
	(0.005)	(0.008)
HC	1.375***	1.512***
	(0.287)	(0.339)
POP 0-14	0.001	0.127***
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Constant	0.276	-1.716
	(1.734)	(1.832)
Threshold estimate $\hat{\gamma}$	-1.032*	-0.478*
90% confidence interval	[-1.096, -0.842]	[-0.598, -0.125]
SupWStar test	15.80***	24.84***
	(4.63)	(4.19)
CD test	-0.97	-1.46

*Notes. The Table displays the results of estimates of the effects of control of corruption and the other macroeconomic factors on gender youth unemployment. The asterisks ***; **; * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. SupWStar is the bootstrapped likelihood ratio statistics of threshold effect tests. CD is the cross-sectional dependence test of Peseran (2004).*

Regarding the macroeconomic variables, it is clear that the enhancement of GDP growth is associated with the decline of youth unemployment for men and women. This result is consistent with most studies in the field (O'Higgins, 2012; Bruno et al., 2017). The coefficient of the inflation rate is statistically significant for young men and women. However, its sign is unexpected for young men : higher inflation is associated with a higher unemployment rate among men. In addition, we can observe that the coefficient of the human capital index is positive and statistically significant for both male and female populations, which implies that a higher investment in human capital is associated with higher male and female unemployment rates. According to Kuepié et al. (2009), the unemployment of skilled workers in West African countries is aggravated mainly by the lasting freeze in civil service recruitment. Moreover, authors affirm that the deterioration in the quality of public education and the inadequacy with the need of informal sector led to massive unemployment and undermine the value of human capital investment. In this context, Morsy and Mukasa (2019) considers that, in Africa, the mismatch between demand and supply of skills is bi-dimensional since it concerns both the educational attainment and the quality of acquired skills. In addition, informality is considered as a key determinant of qualification mismatch especially for youth (ILO, 2019). Hence, in African countries, skills mismatch, is mainly due to the crushing weight of the informal economy and the prominence of low-quality jobs (Robles, 2022). Furthermore, Robles considers that gender disparities in terms of

qualification mismatch, can be associated to differences in educational or occupational choices. Youth people who suffer greatly from lack of professional employment (Kuepié and Nordman, 2016) are forced to choose between jobs that do not match their skills and unemployment. Accordingly, human capital investment is not a sufficient condition to obtain a job, it provides youth the occasion to keep one's place in the queue for the desired job (Herrera and Merceron, 2013).

Similarly, Bruno et al. (2017), stated that a long period of unemployment deteriorates the skills of young workers, causes a permanent loss of human capital and delays the employment of young people.

Finally, the size of the population aged between 0 and 14 years exerts a positive effect on the unemployment rate only for young women.

4.2. Gender youth unemployment rate and governance indicators

To check the robustness of our findings, we included five additional governance indicators proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010), namely, Government Efficiency (GE), Regularity Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), Political Stability (PS) and voice and accountability (VA). We especially want to assess, on the one hand, whether these indicators affect youth unemployment and, on the other hand, whether there are gender-dependent effects**.** Results are given in Tables 4, 5 and 6.

Table 4. Threshold effects of governance indicators on overall youth unemployment rates

	GE	RQ	RL	PS	VA
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_1$	0.976*	0.615	1.410***	0.960**	-0.731
	(0.508)	(1.512)	(0.373)	(0.393)	(1.223)
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_2$	-0.546*	-2.988***	-0.858***	-0.394	-1.706***
	(0.316)	(0.961)	(0.408)	(0.332)	(0.495)
Lag_YUR	0.577***	0.679***	0.644***	0.602***	0.682***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.035)
GDPG	-0.211***	-0.220***	-0.204***	-0.205***	-0.207***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.006)
INFR	0.019	-0.006	0.017***	0.017	0.014
	(0.617)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.012)
HC	0.122***	0.429	-0.422	0.022	-0.704
	(0.060)	(0.810)	(0.727)	(0.599)	(0.836)
POP 0-14	1.344***	0.144***	0.068	0.092**	0.120**
	(3.377)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.0485)	(0.056)
Constant	-0.211***	-0.576	3.146	3.014	0.740
	(0.007)	(3.088)	(3.057)	(2.836)	(4.129)
Threshold estimate	-0.53*	-0.52*	-0.41*	-1.42*	-0.45*
90% confidence interval	[-1.2, -0.05]	[-0.6, -0.3]	[-0.5, -0.3]	[-1.7, -0.4]	[-0.5, -0.4]
SupWStar	21.18***	24.99***	16.66***	15.81***	14.69***
	(5.20)	(7.34)	(5.04)	(3.02)	(4.13)
CD-test	-0.48	-0.82	-0.52	-0.72	-0.63

*Notes. The Table displays the results of estimates of the effects of other governance indicators and the other macroeconomic factors on overall youth unemployment rates. The asterisks ***; **; * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. SupWStar is the bootstrapped likelihood ratio statistics of threshold effect tests. CD is the cross-sectional dependence test of Peseran (2004).*

The results show that all governance indicators have a threshold effect on youth unemployment for both men and women. However, we find that all the threshold values have negative values, which indicates that institutions in African countries are weak; thus, governments should ensure a more favourable institutional environment to encourage good governance that will be able to eradicate corruption and improve youth employment. It should be remembered that governance indicators take values from −2.5 to +2.5, with a higher level indicating more efforts towards good governance.

Table 5. Threshold effects of governance indicators on male youth unemployment rates

	GE	RQ	RL	PS	VA
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\mathbf{1}}$	0.656**	3.801**	1.001*	0.997***	9.433***
	(0.284)	(0.407)	(0.191)	(0.118)	(0.661)
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{\mathbf{2}}$	-0.509**	-0.121	-0.524	-0.064	-0.399***
	(0.177)	(0.471)	(0.319)	(0.136)	(0.223)
Lag_YUR^{M}	0.760***	0.751***	0.762*	0.753***	0.748***
	(0.088)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.015)
GDPG	-0.128***	-0.143***	-0.141*	-0.146***	-0.129***
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)
INFR	0.022***	0.024***	0.026*	0.013*	0.016*
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
HC	1.158***	0.309	0.239	1.053**	0.68
	(0.406)	(0.375)	(0.504)	(0.415)	(0.672)
POP 0-14	0.017	-0.005***	-0.021	0.050**	0.005
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.07)
Constant	0.010	3.007	3.683	-1.179	0.929
	(0.007)	(2.029)	(2.998)	(2.318)	(3.917)
Threshold estimate	-1.2*	-0.6*	-0.9*	-1.3*	-0.3*
90% confidence interval	[-1.5, -1.8]	[-1.1, -0.1]	[-1.3, -0.08]	[-1.8, -0.4]	[-0.9, -0.4]
SupWStar	21.53***	37.96***	23.52***	14.25***	13.74***
	(5.02)	(8.35)	(4.83)	(4.18)	(5.50)
CD-test	-0.79	-0.68	-0.35	-0.36	-0.47

*Notes. The Table displays the results of estimates of the effects of other governance indicators and the other macroeconomic factors on male unemployment rates. The asterisks ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. SupWStar is the bootstrapped likelihood ratio statistics of threshold effect tests. CD is the cross-sectional dependence test of Peseran (2004).*

For total youth unemployment, all additional governance indicators, except political stability, have the expected negative threshold effect. This result is inconsistent with Abé Ndjié (2019), who found that only the control of corruption and political stability indicators reduce youth unemployment in African countries. Regarding the population of young men, the estimated effects of government effectiveness and voice and accountability are statistically significant in both regimes. Thus, in addition to the control of corruption, these two governance indicators are seen as the key determinants of male youth unemployment. Concerning young women, two governance indicators, namely, political stability (PS) and voice and accountability (VA), can be considered the major determinants of youth unemployment. Indeed, only 5 out of 33 countries (namely Burundi, Central Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Soudan) display mean PS indicator scores below the

threshold value (-1.350) suggesting that most African countries succeed to ensure political stability and thereby improve the women youth employment. In contrast, only 13 out of 33 sample countries show significant mean VA scores above the VA threshold value (-0.445). Moreover, the VA indicator exhibits significant negative effects in both regimes.

Table 6. Threshold effects of governance indicators on female youth unemployment rates

	GE	RQ	RL	PS	VA
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_1$	6.537***	2.133***	4.927***	1.783***	-1.705***
	(1.006)	(0.770)	(0.307)	(0.568)	(0.271)
$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_2$	1.555*	-0.265	3.142***	-1.001***	-1.845***
	(0.997)	(1.069)	(0.470)	(0.298)	(0.269)
Lag_YUR^W	0.651***	0.689***	0.660***	0.659***	0.671***
	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.012)
GDPG	-0.169***	-0.181***	-0.170***	-0.160***	-0.164***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)
INFR	0.011*	-0.001	0.018**	0.009	0.007**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.003)
HC	3.338***	2.996***	0.345	2.164***	2.436***
	(0.903)	(0.454)	(1.027)	(0.711)	(0.372)
POP 0-14	0.056	0.231***	0.082***	0.238***	0.198***
	(0.099)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.027)
Constant	-0.425	-7.737***	3.993	-6.148**	-7.192***
	(5.412)	(2.389)	(3.428)	(2.739)	(1.939)
Threshold estimate	-0.8*	-0.5*	-0.6*	-1.4*	-0.5*
90% confidence interval	[-1.3, -0.2]	[-0.8 -0.1]	[-0.7, -0.5]	[-1.7, -0.4]	[-0.7, -0.04]
SupWStar	17.34***	20.16***	14.84***	22.90***	20.41***
	(3.59)	(4.43)	(4.45)	(3.58)	(5.34)
CD-test	-0.64	-0.81	-0.51	-0.74	-0.38

*Notes. The Table displays the results of estimates of the effects of other governance indicators and the other macroeconomic factors on female unemployment rates. The asterisks ***; **; * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. SupWStar is the bootstrapped likelihood ratio statistics of threshold effect tests. CD is the cross-sectional dependence test of Peseran (2004).*

In addition, government effectiveness and rule of law have significant positive effects in both regimes, suggesting that the government's efforts towards good governance relating to these two indicators are still insufficient to promote the employment of young women.

5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This paper focuses on the nonlinear relationship between the control of corruption and youth unemployment by gender in a sample of 33 African countries during the 2002-2020 period. To do so, we use a dynamic threshold model that accounts for endogeneity bias, as proposed by Kremer et al. (2013). Our findings suggest that corruption is one of the major determinants of youth unemployment and the cause of gender inequality in African labour markets. The control of corruption exerts a threshold effect on African youth unemployment. Gender analysis shows that the estimated threshold value of the control of corruption is

(-0.478) for young women, which is higher than the estimated threshold value for young men (-1.03). The negative sign of the control of the corruption threshold, as well as that of other governance indicators, confirms that African countries have weak institutions and poor governance.

The effect of corruption on joblessness appears to be stronger for women than for males. When compared to young males, young women have a greater population-wide estimated threshold value for the control of corruption. It's true that employment discrimination against women is a real thing, and that bribery is sometimes necessary for women to land a job. However, we find that the estimated impacts of reducing corruption on joblessness are significantly larger for young women than for young men. The employment rate of women will benefit more from improvements in the control of corruption score than that of males.

Thus, more efforts are needed to curtail corruption and promote gender-equitable employment in African countries. Indeed, we find that the weakness of the rule of law is still a major obstacle for the employment of young women. Accordingly, policymakers should minimize the number of failures in government institutions to curb corruption practices and improve labour market outcomes. In particular, to reduce youth unemployment rates, anti-corruption policies must be followed by accompanying measures that are likely to improve the quality of governance in African countries, such as ensuring political stability, strengthening government effectiveness and promoting accountability.

Addressing gender-based corruption and unemployment in Africa requires policy changes, institutional reforms, awareness campaigns, and community engagement. Enforce and strengthen anti-corruption laws and regulations to prevent bribery, nepotism, and other forms of corruption that disproportionately affect women. In addition, increasing the digitization of the economy improves transparency and accountability in governance and reduces corruption (Shenkoya, 2023). Thus, the digitalization of African economies creates jobs for young people who will have equal opportunities to access digital employment. (ILO, 2022). Such policies may be considered priorities to foster economic growth, improve youth employment and promote gender equality in African labour markets. Our study has some limitations. First, the study may have overlooked different African economic, cultural, and political issues which could have significant impacts on gender dynamics, corruption, and youth unemployment. Furthermore, changes in these variables over time may impact our research findings. Second, we employed a threshold dynamic panel model with homogeneous control of corruption threshold effects on gender-based young unemployment. Individual-level variability in threshold effects may be missed by the model. As a result, our findings may not generalize well to other African countries with significant socio-economic heterogeneity. As a result, it is recommended that future research efforts be done to address the aforementioned weaknesses in order to improve the existing study.

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ANNEX

Table A1. List of 33 African countries

Country	Abbreviation	Country	Abbreviation
Algeria	DZA	Lesotho	LSO
Benin	BEN	Botswana	BWA
Burundi	BDI	Morocco	MAR
Burkina Faso	BFA	Madagascar	MDG
Botswana	BWA	Mali	MLI
Central Africa	CAF	Mauritania	MRT
Ivory Coast	CIV	Mozambique	MOZ
Benin	BEN	Mauritius	MUS
Burundi	BDI	Malawi	MWI
Burkina Faso	BFA	Niger	NER
Botswana	BWA	Nigeria	NGA
Central Africa Republic	CAF	Rwanda	RWA
Ivory Coast	CIV	Sudan	SDN
Cameroun	CMR	Senegal	SEN
Congo Democratic	COG	Swaziland	SWZ
Egypt	EGY	Togo	TGO
Ethiopia	ETH	Tunisia	TUN
Gabon	BFA	Uganda	UGA
Ghana	GHA	South Africa	ZAF
The Gambia	GMB	Zambia	ZMB
Kenya	KEN		

Table A2. Mean of the six governance indicators for the period 2002-2020

Country	CC	GE	PS	RQ	RL	VA
BDI	-1.13	-1.28	-1.75	-1.10	-1.24	-1.17
BEN	-0.55	-0.47	0.31	-0.41	-0.49	0.23
BFA	-0.22	-0.63	-0.42	-0.28	-0.49	-0.27
BWA	0.90	0.50	1.03	0.56	0.61	0.54
CAF	-1.15	-1.54	-1.81	-1.23	-1.49	-1.10
CIV	-0.79	-0.88	-1.29	-0.62	-1.03	-0.81
CMR	-1.14	-0.84	-0.76	-0.83	-1.11	-1.05
COG	-1.16	-1.21	-0.78	-1.23	-1.21	-1.13
DZA	-0.63	-0.60	-1.25	-0.95	-0.82	-0.98
EGY	-0.62	-0.50	-0.93	-0.51	-0.27	-1.12
ETH	-0.59	-0.67	-1.44	-1.04	-0.69	-1.22
GAB	-0.84	-0.72	0.20	-0.50	-0.54	-0.81
GHA	-0.15	-0.10	-0.01	-0.09	0.00	0.36
GMB	-0.57	-0.64	0.15	-0.46	-0.41	-0.90
KEN	-0.97	-0.50	-1.18	-0.26	-0.76	-0.33
LSO	0.03	-0.43	-0.01	-0.50	-0.16	-0.06
MAR	-0.25	-0.12	-0.35	-0.17	-0.11	-0.62
MDG	-0.56	-0.83	-0.25	-0.53	-0.62	-0.33
MLI	-0.68	-0.87	-0.68	-0.47	-0.48	-0.04
MRT	-0.64	-0.64	-0.43	-0.55	-0.73	-0.85
MUS	0.35	0.75	0.91	0.76	0.92	0.85
MWI	-0.58	-0.59	-0.08	-0.57	-0.26	-0.20
NER	-0.73	-0.76	-0.79	-0.61	-0.60	-0.46
NGA	-1.15	-1.03	-1.81	-0.88	-1.12	-0.68
RWA	0.10	-0.25	-0.60	-0.36	-0.46	-1.27
SDN	-1.30	-1.33	-2.17	-1.41	-1.35	-1.72
SEN	-0.17	-0.28	-0.24	-0.19	-0.17	0.10
SWZ	-0.32	-0.68	-0.21	-0.50	-0.55	-1.36
TGO	-0.87	-1.23	-0.44	-0.76	-0.83	-0.96
TUN	-0.12	0.19	-0.29	-0.17	-0.04	-0.53
UGA	-0.93	-0.52	-1.02	-0.17	-0.43	-0.64
ZAF	0.23	0.49	-0.15	0.42	0.10	0.66
ZMB	-0.54	-0.74	0.21	-0.49	-0.42	-0.28

Corruption control (CC), government efficiency (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), political stability (PS) and voice and accountability (VA).

Analyse par genre des effets de la corruption sur le chômage des jeunes dans les pays africains : un modèle de panel à seuil

Résumé - Cet article vise à évaluer l'effet de la corruption sur le chômage des jeunes en distinguant les hommes et les femmes, dans un échantillon de 33 pays africains au cours de la période 2002-2021. Pour ce faire, nous avons utilisé un modèle de données de panel à seuil, développé par Kremer et al. (2013). Les résultats montrent l'existence d'une relation non linéaire entre le contrôle de la corruption et le chômage des jeunes hommes et femmes. Le contrôle de la corruption a des effets positifs (négatifs) sur le taux de chômage des jeunes lorsque les seuils de corruption sont inférieurs (supérieurs) à -1,03 pour le taux de chômage des jeunes hommes et à -0,48 pour le taux de chômage des jeunes femmes. Les seuils négatifs indiquent que les mesures anti-corruption sont insuffisantes pour réduire le taux de chômage, en particulier chez les jeunes femmes. En outre, dans les pays où le taux de corruption est faible, une augmentation du score de contrôle de la corruption d'un point réduit le taux de chômage des jeunes hommes de 0,48 et celui des jeunes femmes de 1,61 point de pourcentage. Afin de mieux lutter contre le chômage des jeunes, les gouvernements des pays africains devront essayer d'améliorer la qualité de leurs institutions et parvenir à une meilleure gouvernance susceptible de réduire la corruption.

Mots-clés

Chômage des jeunes
Corruption
Genre
Modèle de panel à seuil
Afrique